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I. INTRODUCTION
The treatment of animals, whether such animals are used for food
production, entertainment, or companionship has generated a significant
1
amount of attention over the last few decades. For many people, their

l. Michael Pollan, An Animal's Place, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 58
(discussing the growth and influence of the animal rights movement), available at LEXIS, News
Library, New York Times File. Consideration of animal rights and welfare issues is of increasing
interest to attorneys as well. A number of law schools have recently included animal law courses
as part of their curriculum. Steven M. Wise, Liberty and Equality, NAT'L L.J., Aug~ 12, 2002, at
A19 (stating that "[t]wenty-five American law schools, including Harvard, offer animal law
classes, as do law schools in Britain, Holland and Australia''). Animal law sections and
committees are being formed under the auspices of state and local bar associations. Stephanie
Davis, Lawyers: Pets Have Place in Court: New York Latest in String of States To Formalize
Legal Committee Dedicated to Animal Well-being, DVM NEWSMAG., Sept. 1, 2002 (discussing
the fonnation of a committee in the New York Bar Association and other committees and
sections in bar associations across the United States), available at http://
www .dvmnewsmagazine.cornldvm/article/articleDetail.jsp?id=31522 (last visited Mar. 24, 2004);
Adam Karp, Lex Feles et Canis Beyond Ferae Naturae: Practicing Animal Law in Washington,
WASH. STATE BAR NEWS, Feb. 2003, at 16 (discussing practicing animal law in Washington and
the establishment of an animal law section of the Washington State Bar Association), available at
http://www. wsba.org/media/publicationslbarnews/2003/feb-03-beyond.htm (last visited Feb. 25,
2004). For an overview of some of the philosophical views on the treatment of animals, see
Rebecca J. Huss, Valuing Man·s and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Sta.tus of
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focus is on the animals that they interact with on a daily basis their
animal companions. There is a growing body of literature on the
positive impact on human health attributed to interaction with
companion animals. 2 Companion animals are used as part of the
3
treatment for some types of mental illness.
Studies have been
conducted to learn the impact on children of having companio·n animals
4
in their hornes.
5
Many people consider animal companions as part of the family. The
role of these animals as family members has become progressively
6
more important over tirne.
The relationship between people and
companion animals has changed from one of utility to one of affection
7
and companionship. In some households, these animals are viewed in
8
ways similar to that of human children .
Companion Animals, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 47, 52-68 (2002) [hereinafter Huss, Companion Animal
Status].
2. COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTH (Cindy C. Wilson & Dennis C. Turner eds.,
1998) (discussing a variety of studies done on the impact of companion animals in human health).
Research shows that physical contact with companion animals has a calming effect on people and
can decrease blood pressure. Aaron H. Katcher, How Companion Animals Make Us Feel
(discussing how visual and physical contact with animals induces calm and reporting human
physiological changes during interactions with pets), in PERCEPTIONS OF ANIMALS IN AMERICAN
CULTIJRE 113, 120, 123 (R.J. Hoage ed., 1980). One study even found that people with
companion animals had lower cholesterol and triglycerides. ALAN M. BECK & AARON HONORl
KATCHER, BETWEEN PETS AND PEOPLE: THE IMPORTANCE OF ANIMAL COMPANIONSHIP 7
(1996).
3. Elizabeth Blandon, Reasonable Accommodation or Nuisance? Service Animals for the
Disabled, FLA. B.J ., Mar. 2001, at 12. Although the use of service dogs to assist persons with
physical disabilities is well known, recently the use of animals to help persons with mental
disabilities such as depression, panic disorder, and bipolar disorder has generated attention. /d. at
14; see also GAIL F. MELSON, WHY THE WILD THINGS ARE: ANIMALS IN THE LIVES OF
CHILDREN 99-131 (2001) (discussing the use of animals in therapy with children).
4. See generally MELSON, supra note 3 (discussing the relationship between animals and
children and the impact of contact with animals on children). Recent studies indicate that the
presence of animals in a home actually decreases the risk of children having allergies later in life.
Delthia Ricks, Early Exposure to Pets May Put Leash on Allergies Immunology, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2002, at S3 (discussing a recent study that found that exposure to at least two dogs or cats
during the first year of life might drastically reduce the risk of allergies), available. at 2002 WL
2500873.
5. AM. PET PRODS. MFRS. ASS'N, 2003-2004 APPMA NATIONAL PET OWNERS SURVEY, at
xxxiii (2003) (reporting that in a recent poll, 70% of people with dogs and 62% of people with
cats agreed with the. statement that the companion animals in their households were like children
or family members); see also Katcher, supra note 2, at 121 (discussing studies that find thatpets
are viewed as "members of the family").
6. See Katcher, supra note 2, at 123 (citing to the studies that show that fewer people are
having children and that there are fewer children in families).
7. For a discussion on the domestication of animals and the changing role of animals in the
United States, see MELSON, supra note 3, at 19, and Rebecca J. Huss, Separation, Custody and
Estate Planning Issues Relating to Companion Animals, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 181, 188-95
(2003) [hereinafter Huss, Companion Animal Issues]. There are many factors that contributed to
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A significant amount of money is spent on companion animals in the
United States. There are estimates that approximately thirty billion
9
Daily
dollars are spent each year on the care of these animals.
10
expenses include the cost of day care or pet sitting services.
People
spend time with their canines in special dog parks-that include off-leash
11
Vacations
areas to enable dogs to socialize freely with one another.
the development of this new paradigm in the relationship between people and companion
animals. Melson cites the effects of urbanization, industrialization, and isolation of modem
society as reasons for the new relationship. MELSON, supra note 3, at 25-31; see also Leslie
Mann, Celebrating a Pet's Love, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 2000, at 5 (reporting on the changing
perspective of dogs as utility animals to dogs as members of families), available at 2000 WL
3633646.
8. BECK & KATCHER, supra note 2, at 41 (citing the analogous treatment of children and
companion animals). Although sometimes companion animals are viewed as child substitutes,
pets are often present in households with children. MELSON, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that pets
live in ''at least 75% of all American households With children';). Pet ownership increases as
children enter· elementary school. /d. at 32; see also Sandra Block, Pet Insurance Can Save
Owners from Wrenching Decisions, USA TODAY, Feb. 19; 2002, at B3 (citing to survey that
found that 78% of people "thi,nk of their pets as their children"), available at 2002 WL 4719848.
9. Stephanie Fagnani, Animal Magnetism; As No. 2, Grocers Must Work Harder To Sell Pet
ProductsJ by Stocking More Variety, Pricing Competitively, Even Holding Adoption Events To
Spur Sales, SUPERMARKET NEWS, June 10, 2002, at 29 (stating that expenditures in the pet
industry are projected to be $29.5 billion in 2002 and $31 billion in 2003); see also Azell ~1urphy
Cavaan, Animal Magnetism-Doggone It! Americans Have a Soft Spot for Their Pets, BOSTON
HERALD, June 27, 2001, at 56 (stating that in 2001, Americans spent over $28.5 billion on their
companion animals), available at 2001 WL 3804535. Sales of pharmaceuticals for animals (food
producing and companion) increased 4.5o/o from 2000 to 2001, reaching $3.2 million. David
Ranii, Sniffing Out Discomfort, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Sept. 10, 2002, at Dl,
available at 2002 WL 11737062.
10. Dog sitting services can be used when a family is out of town or on a daily basis; a dog (or
cat) sitter comes to the home and walks, feeds, and otherwise interacts with an animal. Generally
for day care the animal is dropped off (or in some cases picked up and taken to a central location)
to interact w-ith othe.r dogs and caretakers. Dave Ford, Bark and Ride~· Pet Taxi Fills Void in
Driver's Life, Clients' Schedules, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 2, 2001, at l, available at 2001 WL
3393992. The cost of these services varies considerabfy based on the geographic location and
level of care. Beth Dolan, Yappy Days, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 23, 2001, at 1, available at 2001 WL
5497110. There are organizations that provide infonnation about sitters in various geographic
areas. See, e.g., PETSiriERS.COM, FIND A SITIER, at http://www.petsitters.com (last visited Feb.
20, 2004); see also Betsy Cook Donahue, Dog Days: If It Is a Dog;s Life, It's a Pretty Good One
These Days, CHARLESTON GAZE'1TE, Feb. 16, 2000, at PID (stating that 27% of customers in a
recent PETsMART survey said that they take their pets to day care), available at 2000 WL
2593104.
11. Talk of the Nation: Designated Parks for Dogs (NPR radio broadcast, Aug. 28, 2001),
transcript available at 2001 WL 4190091; see also Brian E. Clark, Dog Park Is Possible for
Rancho Bernardo: Council's Maienschein Working on Project, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRlB., Oct.
20, 200 I, at NI 1, available at 2001 WL 27295723; Robert E. Misseck, Dogs Get a Place To
Roam at Echo lnke, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Nov. 9, 2001, at 37; Eileen Rivers, At New
Park, Every Dog Has His Play; Quiet Waters Opens Canine Rumpus Room, WASH. POST, Dec. 6,
2001, at T03, available at 2001 WL 30330688; Dina Sanchez, Talk of Dog Park Perks Ears in
Winter Springs; Group Wants One Even More Fetching than Sanford's, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Dec~ 21, 2001, at G1, available .a t 2001 WL 28430360; Annie Sweeney, Lincoln Parkers Want
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can now include the entire family, human and non-human, with
resources available to find pet friendly hotels and resorts or even camps
12
where humans and their dogs can go to train and bond.
If animals
must be left behind, the animals are not left in stark kennels but are now
boarded at "retreats" that provide individualized care and color
13
television for discriminating viewers.
Just as with other family members, when an animal is ill, its owners
take it to a medical professional a veterinarian. One survey indicated
that 91 % of pet owners take their dogs or cats to a veterinarian
14
regularly. Although the level of care can range significantly, one poll
found that the average number of visits to a veterinarian per year was

Place for Their Dogs, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at 23, available at 2001 WL 7243054;
Fred Swegles, Dogs Will Get Their Day in City's Parks: Council Approves Creating a Place for
Pooches Only, Access to Three Parks, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Oct. 12, 2001, at Cover, available
at 2001 WL 9687382.
12. CRUDEN BAY BOOKS, HIKE WITH YOUR DOG, at http://www.hikewithyourdog.com (last

visited Feb. 2, 2004) (providing links to parks that allow dogs); TRAVEL PETS, WELCOME TO
TRAVEL PETS, at http://www.travelpets.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) (providing travel tips and
listing inns that allow pets); Devin Rose, Camp Dogwood, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 2001, at C 1
(discussing a dog camp north of Chicago and other dog camps), available at 200 I WL 4132169.
Traveling to a vacation spot has become safer for dogs and cats with a new airline that has been
established to transport companion animals in cabins rather than in cargo compartments. See
COMPANIONAIR
AIR
CORP.,
WHAT
WE
DO,
at
http://
www.companionair.com/whatwedo.php (last visited Feb. 2, 2004) (stating that it is the first
airline created for pets and their owners, with discounts on fare prices for human clients).
13. Allan Turner, Dogs Livin' It Up: Pooches Get the Best Their Owners' Money Can Buy,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. II, 2001, at 35 (discussing boarding and other costs relating to the care of
companion animals), available at 2001 WL 2998484; see, e.g., ALL FOR DOGGIES, L.L.C.,
WELCOME TO ALLFOROOGGIES.COM, at http://www.allfordoggies.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004)
(describing products and services, including deluxe boarding, with webcams showing daycare
facilities where canine boarders spend their days); CITIZEN CANINE, CITIZEN CANINE BED &
BREAKFAST FOR DOGS, at http://www.citizencaninechicago.com (last visited Feb. 2, 2004)
(featuring no cage boarding). If animals are left behind, 44o/o can expect a vacation souvenir
upon the family's return. Melissa Draper, Family Ties Extend To Include Pets, NEWS AND
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 27, 2001, at N4 (citing to a survey by the American Animal
Hospital Association), available at 200 l WL 3462468.
14. Christine Winter, Pet Health Insurance Plans Grow by Leaps and Bounds, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 26, 2000, at lA, available at 2000 WL 5648771. One reason for the
regular visits to veterinarians is the requirement that dogs (and sometimes cats) be vaccinated
against rabies pursuant to state law. See JAMES F. WILSON, LAW AND ETHICS OF THE
VETERINARY PROFESSION 79-80 (1988). Unlike childhood vaccinations that are concentrated
within the first few years of life, depending on the jurisdiction, rabies boosters are required every
two or three years. /d. Individual jurisdictions set the frequency that rabies vaccinations must be
administered. /d. Lawsuits alleging that particular statutes relating to the control of animals are
beyond the police power of the jurisdiction have generally been unsuccessful. ORLAND SOAVE,
ANIMALS, THE LAW AND VETERINARY MEDICINE, A GUIDE TO VETERINARY LAW 164 (4th ed.
2000); see also Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 231 ( 1920) (hoi ding that a state statute
requiring the licensing of a dog is not an infringement of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution).
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15
cats.

2.7 for dogs and 2.3 for
Veterinarians may be referred to as the
16
"other family doctor'' or a "pet's family pediatrician." The amount of
money that people are willing to spend on medical care, for their animals
varies widely; however, the total amount of money spent by pet owners
in the United States on veterinary care is estimate.d at twelve billion
17
dollars per year.
More veterinarians now specialize in. areas of medicine such as
dermatology, cardiology, dentistry, neurology, oncology, and
18
ophthalmology . If one is willing and able to pay, veterinary medicine
offers a wide range of preventive care as well as treatment for major

15. AM. PET PROS. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 5, at xx (reporting data from 2002). The average
number of office visits to human physicians in the United States was three per person in 2000.
NAT'L CTR.
FOR
HEALTH
STATISTICS,
0FACE
VISITS· TO
PHYSICIANS,
at
http://www ~cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/docvisit.htm (last updated Oct. '14, 2003). The average number
of visits to human physicians increases significantly with age. David L. Cherry & David H.
Woodwell, National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2000 Summary, in ADVANCE DATA
FROM VITAL & HEALTH STATISTICS 4-5 (Nat'l Ctr. for Health Statistics, No. 328, June 5, 2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/dataladlad328.pdf. (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
16. Animal Hosp~ of Elmont, Inc. v. Gianfrancisco, 418 N.Y.S.2d 992, 993 (Dist. Ct. 1979)
(referring to veterinarians as a "pet;s family pediatrician"). One of the sessions at the 139th
American Veterinary Medical Association Annual Convention held in July 2002 was titled "The
Veterinarian: The Other Family Doctor." AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N, 139TH ANNUAL
CONVENTION PROGRAM 67 (2002) (on file with the author); see also FLA. VETERINARY MED.
ASS'N, HOME PAGE, at http://www.fvma.com· (last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (noting, in a tag line,
"The Other Family Doctor ... Your Veterinarian.").
17. Jerry Gleeson, Dog-gone Expensive, J. NEWS (Westchester Co., N.Y.), Dec. 26, 2001, at
1D (discussing the. total amount of money spent on veterinary care and the reasons for the
increase in costs). Gleeson also reported on a survey by the American Animal Hospital
Association that found that more that one third of the respondents said they "would spend any
amount of money to save the lives of their pets ... eighteen percent .... said they had spent more
than $1,000 on veterinary care for their pets in the previous 12 months." /d. The amount of
money spent on veterinary care has increased significantly in the last decade. Richard Willing,
Under Law, Pets Are Becoming Almost Human,_USA TODAY, Sept. 13, 2000, at 1A (citing to the
American Veterinary Medical Association statistics that "Americans spent $11.1 billion on pet
health care in 1998, up 61% from 1991 "), available at 2000 WL 5789496. The "demand for
veterinary services has grown significantly faster than growth in the overall economy" for the·
period from 1980 through 1997, and growth through the year 2015 is expected to be considerably
higher than the anticipated growth in total consumer expenditures. John P. Brown & Jon D.
Silvennan, The Current and Future Market for Veterinarians and Veterinary Medical Services in
the United State.s: Executive Summary, May 1999, 215 1~ AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 161,
164 (1999). The Executive Summary is derived from a comprehensive ·study of the veterinary
profession that was commissioned by the American Veterinary Medical Association, the
American Animal Hospital Association and the Association of American Veterinary Medical
Colleges. ld. at 161.
18. Peggy Noonan, New Tricks for Old Cats and Dogst Too, USA WEEKEND, May 11-13,
2001, at 6 (discussing veterinary treatments and specialties}, available at http:/l
www.usaweekend.com/Ol_issues/010513/010513pets.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2004); Ingrid
Skjong, A Petts Guide to Vets, MINNEAPOLIS~ST. PAUL MAG., Sept. 1, 2002, at 62 (discussing
veterinary specialties and specialists).
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diseases.
The type of medical care provided to animals is as
sophisticated as the care available to humans and includes laser surgery,
19
CAT scans, and MRis.
Companion animals receive kidney
transplants, surgery to correct ruptured disks, and chemotherapy to treat
An increasing number of animals receive daily
cancer. 20
pharmaceuticals and supplements to improve their quality of life, such
21
as pain medication for arthritis.
Increasingly, psychopharmaceuticals
22
are prescribed to assist in the treatment of behavior problems.
Holistic treatments are available as an alternative to traditional
23
veterinary medicine.
Obviously the cost of these treatments can be significant. There are
HMOs, discount networks, and other insurance plans to assist in paying
24
for the costs of such care"
Some companies now offer pet health

19. Jane E. Brody, V.I.P. Medical Treatment Adds Meaning to a Dog's (or Cat's) Life, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 2001, at F4 (discussing treatments available to companion animals), available at
LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Draper, supra note 13 (discussing laser surgery).
20. Brody, supra note 19, at F4 (discussing treatments available to companion animals); see
also Burkhard Bilger, The Lo.st Meow, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 8, 2003, at 46 (discussing kidney
transplants and other issues relating to specialized veterinary treatment), available at 2003 WL
10742365.

21. Linda Bren, Prescriptions for Healthier Animals: Pet.s and People Frequently Fight
Disease with Simi/at Drugs, FDA CONSUMER, Nov. 1, 2000, at 24 (discussing the drugs used to
treat both humans and animals for arthritis and other diseases), available at 2000 WL 91603600;
Ranii, supra note 9 (discussing pain medication use for veterinary treatment generally and new
medications that are now available).
22. Debra Galant, Dr. Freud, I Think Fido Is Obsessive·Compulsive, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
1999, at F6 (discussing the board certified specialty of animal behavior and the drugs used to treat
behavioral disorders in dogs), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Denise
Grady, Human Drugs Apptovedfor Mental Problems in Dogs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1999, at Al5
(discussing the approval of human drugs for use in dogs), available. at LEXIS, News Library,
New York Times File.
23. Frank Bruni, Acupuncture for the Dog: Alternative Medicine Catches On with Pet
Owners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18~ 1998, at Bl (discussing alternative treatments for animals,
including acupuncture and hydrotherapy), available at LEXIS,. News Library, New York Times
File; Kathleen Kiley, Healing Pets with a Holistic Approach, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2001, § 14CN,
at 7 (discussing holistic veterinary practice including the use of acupuncture), available at
LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File; Sam Lubell, Alternative Medicine for Pets, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2001, § 14WC, at 3 (discussing holistic veterinary practice), available at LEX IS,
News Library, New York Times File. See generally ALTVETMED, COMPLEMENTARY &
ALTERNATIVE VETERINARY MEDICINE, at http://www.altvetmed.com (last visited Feb. 20,
2004); AM. ACAD. VETERINARY ACUPUNCWRE, HOME PAGE, at http://www.aava.org (last
visited Feb. 20, 2004).
24. Winter, supra note 14. Traditional health insurance policies have been available for
twenty years; HMOs and discount networks recently have been established for veterinary
treatment. /d.; see also Michelle Leder, How Much Is That $100 Deductible in the Window?,
N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2001, § 3, at 10 (discussing pet insurance policies), available at LEX IS,
News Library 1 New York Times File. A company called Veterinary Pet Insurance, which has
more than 80% of the business, dominates the market for pet health insurance. Marketplace: Pet
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insurance as an employee benefit.25 Although the number of animals
covered by insurance in the United States is quite low, the pet health
26
insurance business is growing.
The cost of insurance varies
27
depending on the type, age, and health of the animal.
Because the
vast majority of companion animals are not covered by insurance, the
cost of their veterinary care must be covered by their human
28
caretakers.
(Minnesota Public Radio broadcast, Oct. 14, 2002), available at
http://www.marketplace.org/features/doggie_in_the_window/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2004).
25. Marketplace~· Pet Health Insurance, supra note 24 (referring to Metlife, Sprint, and Miller
Brewing as examples of companies that include pet health insurance in their employee, benefit
plans). Other companies that offer pet insurance as an employee benefit include AT&T and
Computer Associates. Yilu Zhao, Break a Leg, Fluffy~ If You Have Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2002, § 9, at 11, available at LEXIS, News Library, New York Times File.
26. Estimates of the number of pet owners who have health insurance for their animals range
from one to three percent. Marketplace: Pet Health Insurance, supra note 24. Note that, in
Europe, approximately thirty percent of pets are covered by insurance. Jd.; Leder, supra note 24;
Patricia Poist-Reilly, Pet Insurance, LANCASTER NEW ERA (Lancaster~ Pa.), Sept. 17, 2001 ,. at 1
(stating that the number of insured pets increased from one percent in 1997 to three percent in
2000).
27. Block, supra note 8. According to the CEO of Veteri.nary Pet Insurance, the "average dog
owner pays $250 a year in premiums .. ~ cat owners pay an average of$200 per year." /d.
28. As further evidence of the importance of these animals, as well as the costs that some will
incur on their behalf, consider how some people handle the death of their companion animals.
The ba'ckyard burial is no longer the only option; pet cemeteries provide a final resting place for
many pets. La Monica Everett-Haynes, Rest in Peace: Sending Spot to His Reward; Casket
Company Tries To Ease Pain of Parting with Pets, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug,. 4, 2000, at B1,
available atLEXIS, News & Business Library, All News File; Andrea Jones, Pet Cemetery an
Idyll to Unconditional Love, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Dec. 25, 2001, at 16D, available at 2001
WL 3705701; John Murawski, A Quiet Resting Place for Lost Loved Ones, PALM BEACH POST,
Feb. 26, 2001, at 1A, available at 200 I WL 14130406; Pat Shellenbarger, Burial Services Help
Survivors Mourn Loss of Pets, SOUTH BEND TRIB., May 21, 2001, at C5 (quoting Brenda Drown,
the executive secretary of the International AssociatiQn of Pet Cemeteries, that there are 750 to
800 pet cemeteries in the United States), available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, All
News File; Dawn Wotapka, Owners Increasingly Opt To Cremate Deceased Pets, NEWS &
OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Sept. 14, 2001, at Nl, available at 2001 WL 3482461 (discussing an
increase in animal cremation and a ban on backyard burials). It is still possible to dispose of an
animal's body by sending it to a local landfill in some municipalities. Wotapka, supra. There are
a few cemeteries that allow for the burial of both humans and animals. Linda Wilson-Fuoco,
Cemetery Offers Resting Place for Pets and Their People, PIITSBURGH POST-GAZETIE, Feb. 20,
2000, at W4 (discussing a pet cemetery located within the bounds of an existing cemetery in
Pennsylvania), available at 2001 WL 10882850; see also Grave Animal Reunion, MX
(Melbourne, Austl.), Sept. 18, 200.J, at 9 (discussing joint human-animal cemetery in Great
Britain), available at LEXIS, News & Business Library, AU N·ews File. If a person cannot bear
to be separated from his or her pet, it is possible to mummify small dogs and cats. SUMMUM,
MODERN MUMMIFICATION, at http://www .summum.org/mummificationlpets/animalcosts.shtml
(last visited Feb. 20, 2004) (providing for mummification of small dogs and cats at prices ranging
from $6000 to $14,000). There are also organizations that bank the genes of animals in
anticipation of the development of technology that will allow them to clone these family
members. Roy Bragg, Businessman Sees Dollars in Replication, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS,
Sept. 4, 2002, at I A (discussing the market for pet-related ventures including pet cloning and
Health
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Given the changing nature of the relationship of humans to
companion animals and the practice of veterinary medicine, it is time to
consider the way that the legal system assesses damages in veterinary
This Article begins with a description of
malpractice cases.
29
veterinarians and the status of veterinary malpractice.
I will compare
veterinarians and human physicians and the malpractice situation for
30
both.
Next, this Article considers the elements and the key issues
31
involved in veterinary malpractice. This Article then analyzes the
current law relating to the damages available in veterinary malpractice
32
suits.
Finally, this Article considers whether the way that these
damages are calculated is appropriate and suggests an alternative to the
33
current system.
The focus of this Article will be on the treatment of
companion animals, as the calculation of damages for malpractice

some criticisms of pet cloning), available at 2002 WL 23795892; Roy Bragg, Replicating Rover,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 3, 2002, at lA (discussing Genetic Savings and Clone, a
company that is banking tissue samples for pets in anticipation of the successful commercial
cloning of animals), available at 2002 WL 23795796; Diane Jennings, Sponsors of Dog-cloning
Project Look Beyond A&M for Results, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. II , 2002, at A47 (citing
to the chief executive officer of Genetic Savings and Clone, Lou Hawthorne, who stated that in
three years the company "hopes to be able to clone dogs consistently for less than $20,000 each").
The A&M cloning project and Genetic Savings and Clone were financed by a 3.7 million dollar
grant from John Sperling and Joan Hawthorne who wished to clone their dog. Helen Rumbelow,
Dog's Owners Are Throwing Late "Missy" a Clone, WASH. POST, July 27, 2002, at A3
(discussing the grant and the work at Texas A&M, which successfully cloned a cat in December
200 I), available at 2002 WL 24823794; see also 48 Hours: Pet Project: Debating the Idea of
Cloning Domestic Pets (CBS News television broadcast, Mar. 29, 2002) (discussing the cloning
of a domesticated cat-Copy Cat and other issues relating to the cloning of domesticated
animals), transcript available at 2002 WL 8873800. See generally Robert F. Blomquist, Legal
Perspectives on Cloning: Cloning Endangered Animal Species, 32 VAL. U . L. REV. 383 (1998)
(discussing issues relating to the cloning of endangered animal species); Stacy J. Ratner, Note,
Baa, Baa, Cloned Sheep, Have You Any Law? Legislative Responses to Animal Cloning in the
European Union and United States, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 141 (1999) (discussing the
legislation in the United States and the European Union related to animal cloning and proposing
that an ethical content be added to U.S. law).
29. See infra Part II.A-B (providing an overview of the veterinary profession and the scope of
veterinary malpractice claims). The following terms are used in this Article: "animal" or
"animals" refer to non-human animal(s); "client" refers to the person who has engaged a
veterinarian to care for his or her animal; and "patient" refers to the animal under a veterinarian's
care.
30. See infra Part II.A. (comparing veterinarians and physicians); infra Pan II.B.4 (comparing
issues in veterinary malpractice and medical malpractice).
31. See infra Part III (discussing elements of veterinary malpractice).
32. See infra Part IV (discussing available economic and non-economic damages in veterinary
malpractice claims).
33. See infra Pan V (analyzing the arguments for and against non-economic damages and
proposing the adoption of veterinary malpractice acts).
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involving animals for
34
uncontroversial to date.

food

production

has

been

relatively

II. VETERINARIANS AND THE STATUS OF VETERINARY
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS

A. Veterinarians
The practice of veterinary medicine is similar in many ways to the
practice of human medicine, with some obvious significant differences.
As with other professionals, the practice of veterinary medicine is
35
governed primarily by state law.
Veterinarians are required to have a
minimum of six years of training, with two years of study in a pre36
veterinary program and four years in a college of veterinary medicine.
Individuals in most states may apply for licensure after obtaining a
Doctor of Veterinary Medicine (D.V.M.) degree and passing a national
37
board examination.
As discussed above, the medical care provided to some companion
38
animals is comparable to the best that human medicine has to offer.
Similar to human medicine, veterinary medicine has developed
specialized practice areas. 39 Because of their status as licensed
professionals, veterinarians, like physicians, receive protection under
Good Samaritan laws in some states if they provide emergency medical
40
care.
34. Equines fall within the category of companion animals, in so much as they are generally
treated on an individual basis rather than as part of a group, at least in connection with damage
awards. Unlike dogs, cats, certain birds, and other animals kept in or near a house, equines
historically have possessed independent economic value. Many early animal welfare statutes
limited their scope to animals that were deemed commercially valuable, such as horses, cattle,
sheep, and swine. DAVID FAVRE & PETER L. BORCHELT, ANIMAL LAW AND DOG BEHAVIOR
254-55 ( 1999). Note, however, that according to one source, the United States slaughters
approximately 100,000 horses per year, and worldwide approximately 75o/o of all racehorses end
their lives at slaughterhouses. GARY L. F'RANCIONE, INTRODUCTION TO ANIMALS RIGHTS:
YOUR CHILD OR THE DoG? 26 (2000). Presumably, at that point in time, the horse is valued
similarly to food producing animals.
35. WILSON, supra note 14, at 50--51.
36. David M. Smith, Pay and Productivity Differences Between Male and Female
Veterinarians, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 493, 495 (2002).
37. /d.; see also SOAVE, supra note 14, at 56-67 (discussing veterinary practice acts and the
general practice of veterinary medicine).
38. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text (discussing the medical procedures
available to animals).
39. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing specialization in veterinary
medicine).
40. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (2002) (stating that a veterinarian providing
emergency care to an injured or sick animal will not be liable for civil damages as a result of the
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Another similarity to physicians is that veterinarians in some states
41
must keep information about their patients confidential.
This
privilege has not arisen out of the common law but instead has been
42
adopted by statute.
Without statutory authorization, courts have been
unwilling to create the privilege between veterinarians and clients,
perhaps because there is no widespread recognition of privacy concerns
43
in connection with the care of animals.
Statements of privilege
generally provide that a veterinarian will n_o t disclose any information
concerning the care of an animal without written authorization or other
44
waiver by the client.
The st'!ltutes also set out exceptions to the
privilege, including the required reporting of communicable diseases.
care, but not precluding liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or
intentional misconduct); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.18826 (West 2001) (providing
protection from liability for civil damages in situations where animals have been brought to a
veterinarian by someone other than their owners but stating that the section would not apply if
acts amount to gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct); OR. REv. STAT. § 686.440
(2001) (providing immunity from civil liability for emergency treatment of animals under certain
circumstances and stating that the section does not apply to acts that constitute gross negligence);
see also Mark Turner, Dial9 I I: Emergency Medical Care Providers, Gross Negligence, and the
Loophole in the Connecticut Good Samaritan Statute, 19 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 419 (2000)
(discussing Good Samaritan statutes covering physicians generally and the Connecticut statute in
particular); Jennifer L. Groninger, Comment, No Duty to Rescue: Can Americans Really Leave a
Victim Lying in the Street? What Is Left of the American Rule, and WUl It Survive Unabated?, 26
PEPP. L. REv. 353; 364-66 (1999) (discussing the adoption in all fifty states ofGood Samaritan
laws to deal with the provision of emergency medical services to humans).
41. Note that statutes relating to confidentiality "contain an exception to their application
when a communicable and reportable livestock disease is involved." Harold W. Hannah, When
Can Failure To Inform Support a Malpractice Claim, 218 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N
14l9, 1420 (2001).
42., COLO. REV. STAT.§ 12-64-120(3) (2003) (providing that records concerning an animal's
care are available to the public unless a veterinary-patient-client privilege exists); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 474.2165 (West 2001) (providing for the ownership and control of veterinary medical
patient records and requiring confidentiality of records with exceptions allowing disclosure);
TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 801.353 (Vernon 2003) (setting forth veterinary-client privilege and
providing exceptions allowing veterinarians to release infonnation concerning a veterinarian's
care of an animal); see also Harold W. Hannah, Communications, Privilege, and the
Veterinarian, 2l9 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass;N, 32, .32 (2001) (discussing confidentiality and
privilege in veterinary medicine).
43. Tucker v. Steel~ & Assocs., No. 93-C 12.68, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4600, at *9 (N.D. Ill.
Apr. 8, 1994) (rejecting the application of a common law veterinarian-client privilege and stating
that "the reasons for seeking veterinary care and the medical condition of an animal are of an
entirely different nature from the personal privacy of one)s own health"). But see GA. CODE
ANN. § 50-I R- 72(a)(2) (Harrison 1998) (providing that public disclosure is not required for
medical or veterinary records "the disclosure of which would be an invasion of personal
privacy"). Note that Illinois now has a statutory provision governing the disclosure of
information contained in veterinary records. 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/25.10 (2002).
44. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 4857 (West 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. ·§ 474.2165(5); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-4-29 (Harrison 1998); 225 ILL. COMP. STAT. 115/25.17 (2002); KAN. STAT.
ANN. 47-839 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 340.286 (West 2001); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN.§ 801.353;
see also Hannah, supra note 42, at 32.
'

'
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Other exceptions to the rule provide for disclosure if the information is
subpoenaed, an issue in litigation, or the subject of an administrative
45
disciplinary action. From a practical perspective, problems arising out
of the disclosure of confidential information in veterinary medicine,
while perhaps not good practice for purposes of client retention, are
46
limited.
Despite the similarities, there are several aspects of a veterinarian's
practice that are distinctly different from the practice of medical
doctors. For example, veterinarians customarily dispense drugs through
47
Medication and supply sales are part of the gross
their practice.
48
One veterinarian
profits that a veterinary practice generates.
estimated that fifteen to twenty percent of his practice's gross profits
49
There is no prohibition
were due to the sale of drugs and treatments.
on pharmaceutical companies selling drugs for animals to phartnacies,
but some of the larger manufacturers have policies that restrict their
50
The American Veterinary Medical
sales to licensed veterinarians.
Association ("AVMA") has expressed concern that some pharmacy
51
practices will undermine the veterinary client-patient relationship.
The A VMA has a position statement that "encourages veterinarians to
52
honor client requests to prescribe rather than dispense a drug"; yet one
veterinarian has stated that he will give prescriptions upon a client's
request but Hover the long run he will advise them to think about
53
seeking pet treatme_n t elsewhere."
Veterinarians indicate that if they
no longer are able to profit from sales of medications, it may be
45. Hannah, supra note 42, at 32.
46. WILSON, supra note 14, at 345. But see Tucker, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4600, at *8-* 10
(discussing the physician-patient privilege in the context of a veterinary malpractice case).
"[T]he purpose behind the physician-patient privilege simply does not apply in the context of the
veterinarian-client relationship because the reasons for seeking veterinary care and the medical
condition of an animal are of an entirely different nature from the personal privacy of one's own
health." /d.
47. Ross Snel, Veterinarians Snarl over Online Drug Sales: Savings to Consumers Take Bite
Out of Doctors' Profits, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2002, at B9G, available at 2002 WL--WSJ
3385776. Oregon statutory law illustrates an exception to the general rule that physicians
customarily do not dispense prescriptions. OR. REv. STAT. § 677.089 (2001) (setting forth the
requirements for physicians dispensing prescription drugs).
48. Snel, supra note 47; see also Ve-terinary Care Without the Bite, CONSUMER REP., July
2003, at 12, 14 (''Drug sales are a leading profit center for veterinarians, constituting 18 percent
of revenue. Markups on medicines range from 100 to 250 percent.").
49. Snel, supra note 47.

50. ld.
51. Rebecca Osvath, FDA, Vet Group Concerned About Illegal Compounding of Animal
Drugs, FOOD CHEMICAL NEWS, May 6., 2002., at 24, available at 2002 WL 11879224.
52. ld.
53. Snel, supra note 47.
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necessary to increase the rates for their other services. 54 Veterinarians
are held to the same standards as other dispensers of controlled
55
There are only approximately a dozen pharmacies that
substances.
56
specialize in medications for pets in the United States, but a growing
7
number of online animal pharn1acies are entering the market. 5
Certainly the compensation for the average veterinarian is far less
than for a medical doctor.
Nationwide, the average salary for
58
veterinarians is $60,910 compared with dentist and doctor mean
59
incomes (in 1999) of $125,358 and $163,000, respectively.
Another distinction is that, pursuant to some state laws, veterinarians
60
may have a lien on the animals under their care.
In this way
veterinarians are treated like any other caretakers of animals, or in fact,
61
In some states, a veterinarian who is not
like automobile mechanics.
62
paid for an animal's care may sell the animal to satisfy the debt.
Just as there are some similarities between the practice of veterinary
medicine and human medicine, parallels can be drawn between the
status of malpractice claims in these two professions.

54. /d.
55. Chris Duke, Vets Must Adhere to DEA Regulations, SUN HERALD (Biloxi, MS), Mar. 11,
2002, at B3, available at 2002 WL 11386954.
56. Anna McCart, Pharmacist Prepares Rx for Pet Medicine, BOSTON HERALD, Jan. 13,
2002, at 30, available at 2002 WL 4065240.
57. Snel, supra note 47.
58. Lisa Heyamoto, Vets Love the Work and the Pets, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, Aug. 21,
2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 22441355.
59. Steve Dale, Clients, Vets Speak Out on Billing Practices, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Feb.
21, 2002, at E3. "Top" veterinarians can make nearly $130,000. Heyamoto, supra note 58. The
actual number of licensed veterinarians in the United States is approximately 65,000, with an
additional 22,000 new veterinarians estimated by 2010. /d.
60. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3051 (West 1993) (providing for liens on animals under the
care of veterinary proprietors and surgeons (as well as liens benefiting drycleaners and plastic
fabricators)); see also SOAVE, supra note 14, at 49. The lien depends on possession of the
animal. /d.
61. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 49-51. The Iowa provision cited to by Soave specifically cites
to "(l]ivery and feed stable keepers, herders, feeders, [or] keepers of stock." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 579.1 (West 1992 & Supp. 2003). The same Iowa code section is used to recover the expenses
of storing motor vehicles and boats. /d. Soave states that "the right to sell or otherwise dispose
of an animal in the holder's possession is not legal in many states." SOAVE, supra note 14, at 50.
62. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3052 (West 1993) (allowing for the public sale by veterinarians of
animals under their care following notice that such sale will occur if amounts due are not paid);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 579.2 (West 1992) (providing for lienholders to sell the specified stock and
property at public auction); see also Jakubaitis v. Fischer, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 39 (Ct. App. 1995)
(analyzing the applicability of sections 3051 and 3052 of the California Civil Code to
veterinarians).
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B. The Status of Veterinary Malpractice Claims
1. Trends in Veterinary Malpractice Claims
It is difficult to obtain statistics on the number of cases brought
against veterinarians for malpractice. One source states that there are
more than two thousand cases of malpractice and negligence filed in
63
U.S. courts each year.
This, of course, does not reflect the actual
number of claims filed with veterinary malpractice insurance carriers.
There are statistics indicating that the frequency and dollar amount of
claims for veterinary malpractice increased significantly in the ten-year
64
The frequency of claims increased from one
period prior to 1993.
claim for every twenty-five insured veterinarians to one claim for every
sixteen insured veterinarians during that period of time, but then
65
remained consistent for a period of years. It is clear that the number
66
of claims, at least in some jurisdictions, is increasing.
There are concerns that the average dollar amount of veterinary
malpractice claims is increasing as well. In the mid-1990s, lawsuits
67
often settled for between $5000 and $10,000.
A 1995 case in
California over the death of a cat when a veterinarian treated the eat's
68
fleas with a toxic product settled for $15,000.
A Kentucky jury
awarded a client $15,000 after a veterinarian negligently spayed a
69
German shepherd causing the animal's death. Botched dental repairs
63. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21. The damages claimed for many of these cases are likely
relatively low dollar amounts. For example, the State of California requires every professional
liability insurer to report any settlement of more than $3000 to the California Veterinary Medical
Board ("CVMB"). CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 801 (West 2003). The CVMB records indicate
that over the last four years the board has received eight reports of settlements over $3000. Email from Gina Bayless, Enforcement Program Manager, California Veterinary Medical Board, to
author (Nov. I, 2002) (copy on file with author).
64. Jack R. Dinsmore, Veterinary Lawsuits: Trends and Defense Strategies, 23 VETERINARY
CLINICS N.AM. 1019, 1019 (1993) (citing infonnation from the American Veterinary Medical
Association ("A VMA") Professional Liability Insurance Trust (the "PLIT")).
65. /d.
66. Telephone Interview with Jay P. O'Brien, CIC, Executive Vice-president, ABD Insurance
and Financial Services (Oct. 28, 2002) (stating that his company has seen an increasing number
of malpractice claims against veterinarians in California in recent years); see also Willing, supra
note 17 (stating that "lawsuits against veterinarians are increasing").
67. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 233.
68. /d. (citing to the Rappaport v. McElroy settlement ~ith insurance company). Note that the
plaintiff in Rappaport alleged a variety of claims against the veterinarian including trespass to
chattel, conversion, and spoliation of evidence. Complaint of Plaintiff, Rappaport v. McElroy,
No. 95E09139 (L.A. Mun. Ct. (Van Nuys Branch) filed Sept. 25, 1995) (copy on file with
author). One of the allegations in the Rappaport case was that the veterinarian lost the deceased
eat' s body when the plaintiff specifically requested that the body be preserved. /d.
69. Stephanski v. Wimpy, No. 96CI 00118, DEC 261.60 (Ky. Cir. Ct. Apr. 14, 1997) (copy on
file with author).
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on a Rottweiler led to a $27,000 award against another California
70
One study found that in the late 1990s, jury
veterinarian in 2000.
awards for the tortious loss of animals generally ranged from $5000 to
71
$35,000 in a six-state survey.
What clearly has changed is the
growing attention to the issue in the general press with cases with large
72
damage awards receiving significant coverage.

2. Reasons for Increases in Veterinary Malpractice Claims
There are several factors often cited for the increase in frequency and
73
dollar amount of claims.
In discussions regarding the increase in
veterinary malpractice, as well as other professional malpractice claims,
one category of factors often referenced is the changes in the litigation
74
system that support these types of claims.
Jack Dinsmore believes
75
that there is an increased willingness to litigate claims. The legal and
mainstream press report cases with large damage awards, leading to the
76
This
perception that these types of awards are commonplace.

70. Evers v. Palmer, No. 773909 (Cal. Super~ Ct. Jan. 4, 2000) (copy on file with author). In
addition to the veterinary malpractice claims, Evers' complaint included claims of conversion and
breach of a California statutory provision. According to the attorney for Evers, owing to
limitations on non-economic damages in veterinary malpractice cases, attorneys in California
have developed alternative theories for recovery. Telephone Interview with Michael Rosten,
Attorney (Jan. 16, 2003); see also Willing, supra note 17 (stating that jury verdicts for harm done
to pets outside the veterinary malpractice area also appear to be increasing, with awards running
as high as $35,000).
71. Willing, supra note 17 (citing to a Jury Verdict Research study finding jury awards of
$5000 to $35,000 in the previous four years in Alabama, California, Connecticut, Kentucky,
Michigan, and Utah).
72. Richard L. Cupp, Jr. & Amber E. Dean, Veterinarians in the Doghouse~· Are Pet Suits
Economically Viable?, 31 THE BRIEF 43, 43 (2002) (discussing media reports of damage awards).
Notwithstanding the coverage of cases where there have been significant monetary awards, it
appears that the average award in cases dealing with companion animals remains relatively low.
See E-mail from Gina Bayless, supra note 63 (noting only eight settlements of more than $3000
were reported to the California Veterinary Medical Board).
73. See Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 102Q-23 (discussing trends in lawsuits against
veterinarians).
74. /d. at 1020-21.
75. /d. at 1020; cf. Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the
Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 717, 746-47 (1998) (stating that one impact of the
American public's perception that there is a litigation explosion has been "to increase the calls
that lawyers receive" and that "(t]he effect of this rhetoric is to make people think that if anything
goes wrong they can get significant compensation"). But see Roselyn Bonanti, Tort "Refonn" in
the States, TRIAL, Aug. 2000, at 28 (stating that one study found that "tort filings have decreased
16 percent since 1996'').
76. Galanter, supra note 75, at 744 47 (discussing the "jaundiced viewH of the civil liability
system in the United States and media distortion of tort issues, including the fact that one study
reported "virtually all" television coverage of trials was triggered if a verdict had an "unusually
large'' punitive damage award).
.

.

.

494

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 35

regularity in image damages results in an increased awareness of the
77
possibility of claims against veterinarians by plaintiff's attorneys.
Presumably, these plaintiffs attorneys will then be more likely to
represent clients with similar lawsuits, increasing the total number of
78
claims.
A second category of factors relates to the changing nature of the
79
Clients now have higher expectations of veterinary
veterinary client.
80
treatments and procedures than they did in previous decades.
Certainly there are clients who are willing to spend a significant amount
of money on sophisticated procedures in order to save a companion
81
animal's life.
There is growing recognition of a significant bond
82
When these
between some people and their companion animals.
companion animals die, their owners can experience grief in a manner
83
similar to when a human family member dies. This is important since
many claims brought against veterinarians relate to the death of an
84
Particularly in connection with equines with a significant
animal.
economic value, there can be corporate or syndicate investors that are
85
accustomed to utilizing the legal system to "replace a financialloss."
Regardless of the type of animal at issue, unhappy clients are more

77. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020. Jay O'Brien also cites to increased publicity as a factor
supporting the increase in the number of claims. O'Brien, supra note 66.
78. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020. Dinsmore also cites to the contingent fee arrangement,
which allows clients the possibility of collecting money for claims without paying the costs of an
attorney's time. /d.
79. /d.
80. /d.; cf 1 ROLAND E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 21 (5th ed.
2000) (discussing reasons for the increase in legal malpractice claims, including "higher client
expectations"); David J. Sokol, The Current Status of Medical Malpractice Countersuits, 10 AM.
J.L. & MED. 439, 442 (1985) (citing the unrealistic expectations of patients arising from the
improvements in ·m edical technology as a major factor in the medical malpractice crisis);
O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the focus of veterinarians on preventive care).
81. See O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the changing nature of veterinary medicine and the
increased investment by clients using sophisticated technology); see also Brody, supra note 19
(discussing medical treatments available to companion animals including CAT scans and
M.R.I.s); Draper, supra note 13 (discussing laser surgery).
82. Huss, Companion Anima/Issues, supra note 7 at 182 & n.6 (discussing the theory that the
way humans speak to companion animals indicates a significant bond).
83. See Sonia S. W aisman & Barbara R. Newell, Recovery of ''Non-economic" Damages for
the Wrongful Killing or Injury of Companion Animals: A Judicial and Legislative Trend, 7
ANIMAL L. 45., 58-59 (2001) (citing to pet headstones and growing counseling services as
evidence of grief); see also Steven M. Wise, Recovery of Common Law Damages for Emotional
Distress, Loss of Society and Loss of Cotnpanionship for the Wrongful Death of a Companion
Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33, 48 (1998) (discussing grief over the loss of an animal).
84. WILSON, supra note 14; at 119-20 (discussing the number of claims associated with the
death of an animal and ways that veterinarians can avoid complaints relating to such deaths).
85. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1021.
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likely than satisfied customers to try to avoid paying a veterinarian's
bill. Just as with other types of professional malpractice, a lawsuit by a
veterinarian to collect on an unpaid bill often results in a counterclaim
against the veterinarian for malpractice. 86
The final category of factors leading to an increase in the number of
claims and in the amount of damages relates to the economic value of
87
the animals themselves. Just as with other forms of personal property,
market pressures and inflation have caused the economic value of at
88
Food producing animals, such as
least certain animals to increase.
cattle, sheep, and chickens, and working equines have always had
89
In contrast, dogs (and presumably, by
measurable economic value.
90
As
analogy, cats) were considered to have no intrinsic value.
discussed below, there have been inroads into the traditional ways that
91
animals, particularly companion animals, have been valued. With the
awarding of higher damages, veterinary malpractice suits become more
92
feasible from an economic perspective for both clients and attorneys.

86. /d.; l MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 7 (discussing claims filed in response to
lawsuits by lawyers for unpaid fees as a major area of legal malpractice actions); see~ e.g.,
Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114, 114-15 (Colo. 2001) (setting aside a damage award based
on professional negligence (as it found that the client did not present expert evidence establishing
that the veterinarian failed to meet the standard of care for veterinarians) in a case where a
veterinarian sued for $2861 in unpaid fees and the defendant's response included a counterclaim
for $5000 for negligent petfonnance of services); Bedford v. Jorden, 698 P.2d 854, 854-56
(Mont. 1985) (affinning summary judgment in favor of veterinarian-defendant for a malpractice
case alleging $50,000 in punitive damages after a parrot died following the filing of a claim with
a credit bureau against the client for an unpaid bill); Lakeshore Animal Hosp. v. Sutton, No. 13083, 1989 WL 78582 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (upholding a trial court's judgment that allowed a
client to counterclaim for professional malpractice after a veterinarian sued her for unpaid
services). Mallen and Smith state that "insurers have reported that malpractice claims filed in
response to fee actions comprise approximately 20 percent of all claims against attorneys." I
MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 7. Mallen and Smith continue by discussing the fact that
these counterclaims act to deter lawyers from suing for unpaid fees. /d. at 8.
87. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1020.
88. /d.
89. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 255 (discussing early welfare statutes that limited
their coverage to animals that were deemed to be commercially valuable).
90. Sentell v. New Orleans & Carrollton R.R., 166 U.S. 698, 700--01 ( 1897) (finding that a
dog that allegedly was negligently killed by a railroad company had no intrinsic value, unlike
other animals that can be used as beasts of burden or for food).
91. See infra Part IV (discussing animal valuation issues).
92. See Paul Marcotte, More than a Pet Project, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 26 (discussing
lawyers who specialize in animal rights and typical damage awards); Mark S. Lindensmith,
Veterinary Malpractice: How Much Was That Doggy in the Window, TRIAL, Jan. 1982, at 49-51
(discussing veterinary malpractice and damages).
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3. Veterinary Malpractice Insurance
The largest provider of professional liability insurance for
veterinarians in the United States is the AVMA' s Professional Liability
93
Insurance Trust (the "PLIT''). The PLIT insures more than 70% of the
94
The PLIT considers the number of
eligible members of the AVMA.
claims, costs of defense, costs of settlement, and other statistics about
its relationship with its insured veterinarians to be proprietary
95
Some information is available that may be used to
information.
reflect the impact of malpractice claims on veterinarians. The PLIT
divides veterinarians into four categories: Small Animal, Mixed Practice
(Predominately Small), Large Animal, and Equine.96 The lowest rates
are available for veterinarians in small animal practices and the highest
97
for equine practices.
Primary insurance coverage (per
claim/aggregate)
ranges
from
$100,000/$300,000
to
98
$1,000,000/$3,000,000.
Excess professional liability insurance is
99
It is also
available up to $5,000,000 (per claim and aggregate).
possible to purchase a professional extension endorsement that covers
claims due to the injury or death of animals under a veterinarian's
100
custody and control unrelated to treatment.
The rates are the same

93. Telephone Interview with Dr. Richard E. Shirbroun, Trust Representative, American
Veterinary Medical Association Professional Liability Insurance Trust (Sept. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
Shirbroun Interview].
94. ld. The AVMA created the PLIT in 1962 to provide a source of professional liability
coverage for veterinarians. ld.
95. /d. A few articles relating to professional liability issues were published by the Journal of
the American Veterinary Medical Association through the 1980s. Joseph H. King, Jr., The
Standard of Care for Veterinarians in Medical Malpractice Claims, 58 TENN. L. REV. 1, 2 n.3
(1990); Gregg A. Scoggins, Legislation Without Representation: How Veterinary Medicine Has
Slipped Through the Cracks ofTort Refoml, 1990 U. ILL. L. REv. 953,955 n.l7.
96. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N; PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE TRUST (2001)
[hereinafter AVMAPLIT] (listing annual premiums effective January 1, 2001), available at
http://www .avmaplit.cornlindex.cfm?cont=nonmember/data!Professional.htm (last visited Jan. 14,
2003). Similarly, legal studies on legal malpractice claims (and the applicable rates) divide
practitioners into several practice areas, including corporate and business organizations, real
estate, personal injury, criminal law, and family law. l MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 3031 (citing to studies of malpractice claims by area of law); Mark Hansen, Pricey Premiums:
Malpractice Insurance Casts May Continue To Rise Before They Fall, A.B.A. J., Aug. 2002, at
26 (stating that the increase in legal malpractice insurance rates depends in part on the area of
practice).
97. AVMAPLIT, supra note 96 (listing annual premiums effective January 1, 2001). From
even a layperson's standpoint, the higher rates for equine practice make sense given the large
damage awards that historically have been awarded in successful malpractice cases relating to
equines in comparison to the low damage awards in cases involving loss of companion animals.
98. Jd.
99. /d.
100. /d.
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regardless of the geographic location of a veterinarian's
1
2
The PLIT has not changed its rates since 1994. 0
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101
practice.

4. Comparison to Medical Malpractice
The relatively stable situation for veterinarians is in sharp contrast to
the professional liability insurance and malpractice situation for
physicians. 103 Medical malpractice claims increased substantially in the

101. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93. This is in contrast to medical and legal malpractice
insurance rates, which are dependent in part on the location of the professional. Hansen, supra
note 96, at 26 (discussing increasing malpractice rates and citing experts that state that such rates
are up by IOOo/o or more "depending on such criteria as location, claims history, policy limits and
area of practice;,).
102. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93. The rates actually decreased from 1992 to 1994 and
have remained unchanged since that time. /d. The rates are set pursuant to actuarial tables that
take into account, in part, the number of claims and e·xtent of damages. /d.
103. Medical malpractice claims include suits against healthcare professionals other than
physicians, but just as with physicians, the trend appears to be an increase in cases and awards in
other areas of medical practice. E.g., Sokol, supra note 80, at 442 n.IS (discussing the dental
malpractice crisis). The malpractice situation for other professionals also has been considered in
crisis. For example, there was approximately a 155% increase in legal malpractice decisions in
the 1990s. 1 MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 80, at 21 (citing to studies on the number of
published appellate decisions concerning legal malpractice). There is a significant increase in the
number of lawyers in the population (with new admissions at 30,000 to 32,000 per year); the
relative rate of increase of decisions is greater than this increase in lawyer population. /d.
(analyzing statistics on malpractice decisions and growth in the lawyer population). Mallen and
Smith report that "the rate of increase is declining, though the absolute number of claims is not."
/d. As with veterinary malpractice insurers, legal malpractice insurers generally do not disclose
data on the number and cost of claims. /d. at 21-22 (discussing avaihtble statistics on legal
malpractice claims). Notwithstanding the limited inforrnation available, statistics "confinn the
trend of reported decisions that claims frequency is not increasing significantly but severity (size
of loss) is increasing." /d. at 22. As with medical malpractice rates, legal '~malpractice insurance
rates have been on the increase in recent years." WARREN FREEDMAN, A GUIDE TO
MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR LEGAL AND LAW-RELATED PROFESSIONS 12-13 (1995) (citing to
a rate increase of 20% by the Attorneys Liability Assurance Society). Some of the recent
increases have been attributed to the changing legal climate after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001; however, market forces are considered to be the driving force in the
increasing rates. Hansen, supra note 96. "Legal malpractice insurance rates are up across the
board for the first time in years ...." ld. For example, one carrier that covers lawyers practicing
in large fim1s "raised its rates by 35 percent to 40 percent at the start of the year." /d. Another
company that insures solo practitioners and small finn lawyers "is raising rates 5 percent to 30
percent." /d. The market for insurance for attorneys is reportedly tightening with experts
predicting that rates will likely increase before any leveling or decrease. /d. Insurers also are
reallocating risk in other ways, such as adding exclusions and lowering policy limits. !d.
Although there are concerns about rising legal malpractice rates, the situation is better than in
previous decades, particularly "the mid-1980s, when many lawyers couldn't find insurance or
couldn't afford the coverage that was available." ld~ (citing to experts in insurance). In order to
assist attorneys in obtaining coverage, some state bars have created their own insurance
companies. Mark Hansen, Under Covered: Proponents Say Fewer Lawyers Will Go Bare If
Forced To Disclose Their Insurance Status, A.B.A. J., Nov. 2001, at 46 (stating that there were
sixteen bar-related insurance companies that offer malpractice insurance in thirty states)
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104
rnid-1980s.

mid-1970s and
In response to the increasing number of
malpractice suits and damage awards, insurance companies increased
105
their rates significantly .
In the 1990s, the severity of claims steadily
increased; however, the increase did not result in a malpractice "crisis,"
106
as in the previous two decades.
Initially, in response to- the
increasing costs of insurance, physicians cancelled high risk procedures,
formed their own insurance carriers, and lobbied extensively for
107
refortns in the liability laws to prevent excessive damage awards.
Within the- last few years there have been concerns that another
108
malpractice crisis could lead to a reduction in patients' access to care.
Insurance rates and the number of claims per physician vary
109
substantially from state to state.
The American Medical Association h~s identified the primary cause
of the "emerging crisis" as the "escalation in jury awards in medical

104. Patricia J. Chupkovich, Statutory Caps: An Involuntary Contribution to the Medical
Malpractice Insurance Crisis or a Reasonable Mechanism for Obtaining Affordable- Health
Care?, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 337, 337 (1993). In the 1960s, the frequency of tort
claims per one hundred physicians was one claim per one hundred doctors. PAUL C. WEILER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 2 (1991). In the mid-1980s, the number of claims was
seventeen claims per one hundred doctors. Jd~ By the end of the 1980s the number of claims was
approximately thirteen claims per one hundred doctors. Jd~; see also Jason Leo, Note, TortsMedical Malpractice: The Legislature's Attempt To Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid
Claims, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1399, 1402-06 (2000) (examining the history of medical
malpractice claims and statutes).
105. Chupkovich, supra note 104, at 337.
I06. See David M. Studdert, Toward a Workable Model of "No·fault" Compensation for
Medical Injury in the United States, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 225, 225 (2001) (discussing the cyclical
nature of medical malpractice and issues with insurance coverage); see also Bonanti, supra note
75 (stating that one study found that ''tort filings have decreased 16 percent since 1996" and
another study found "only 2 percent of persons injured by negligent medical care filed suit").
107. Chupkovich, supra note 104, at 337-38. But see Bonanti, supra note 75 (citing studies
that show that "excessive verdicts in civil cases are rare" and "only 7 ~2 percent of civil litigants
received damages of $1 million or more, and million-dollar verdicts continue to be awarded only
in cases involving the most severe injuries").
108. John A. MacDonald, Bush: Cap Awards in Malpractice Cases; President Says Doctors
Are Leaving, HARTFORD COURANT, July 26, 2002,_at A3, available at 2002 WL 24224973; Rob
Stein, Increase in Physicians' Insurance Hurts Care; Service$ Are Being Pared, and Clinics Are
Closing, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2003, at AOl, available at 2003 WL 2366088. This same argument
has been used against proposals to allow increased damage awards for veterinary malpractice
claims. See irifra notes 303--08 and accompanying text (discussing arguments that allowing non·
economic damages in veterinary malpractice cases will result in less access to veterinary care).
I 09. Robyn Suriano & Greg Groeller, Malpractice Rates Soar~octors Rethink Risks;
Patients Are Caught in the Middle as Doctors Flee Florida To Avoid Rising Insurance Costs,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 22, 2002, at Al, available at 2002 WL 100141438. For example,
according to one in,surance provider in Aorida, one out of every forty-four doctors settles a
malpractice claim nationwide compared with one out every eighteen doctors in Florida. ld~
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malpractice cases." 110 In contrast, lawyers representing patients point
to poor management and investment losses by. insurance carriers along
with market forces that kept premiums artificially low in the early
111
1990s.
Early efforts at tort reform occurred at the state level, with a
112
The tort reform provisions
majority of the states enacting legislation.
often consisted of statutory caps on damages in response to concerns
over high and inconsistent non-economic losses, though there were
other provisions adopted in an attempt to make the litigation process
113
more efficient and to screen out non-meritorious cases.
In addition to
110. MacDonald, supra note 108. Studies cited by the AMA state that "median jury awards
increased 43 percent [in 2001]" and that "half of all jury awards in malpractice cases top $1
million." /d. Another problem is the increasing number of insurance companies that are leaving
the malpractice market and causing physicians to scramble for coverage. See Kris Hundley,
Prognosis for Trouble, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. II, 2002, at 8E (reporting the withdrawal
of St. Paul Company, the second largest malpractice insurer in the United States, from the market
and noting other insurance carriers that were leaving the Florida market), available at 2002 WL
15926502. Other factors have been cited as causes of the malpractice crisis, including unrealistic
expectations of patients, fear of overly sympathetic responses from juries leading to settlements
for cases that may be non-meritorious, and the contingent fee system. Sokol, supra note 80, at
442-45.
Ill. Suriano & Groeller, supra note 109 (discussing insurance coverage and the malpractice
crisis in Aorida); Frank Todaro, What's the Key to the Medical-nzalpractice Dilemma?,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 18, 2002, at 19A (citing to failed insurance profits from poor
investments as one reason for the crisis), available at 2002 WL 100598241; Refuting the Myth
That Iowa Is a Litigious State , IOWA LAW., Nov. 2002, at 9-10 (discussing a task force that was
set up in Iowa to detennine the medical malpractice situation in the state and raising the
possibility that malpractice rates are increasing "because of insurance industry pricing errors, lost
investment income, and the premium price war in the 1990s with the off-the-map stock market
covering the spread"). As one commentator states:
[T]he most central argument against the caps for health care providers is that if there is
a crisis ... the problem is theirs and not that of an individual victim of their
negligence; and that while government might provide assistance to the providers, the
individual victim should not be forced to do so.
DAN B. DOBBS, LAWS OF REMEDIES DAMAGES EQUITY RESTITUTION 526-27 (2d ed. 1993).
112. Chupkovich, supra note I 04, at 338 (stating that twenty-seven states enacted legislation).
113. /d. at 353 & n.ll9 (discussing tort refonn and non-economic damages); see also Neasbitt
v. Warren, 22 S.W.3d 107, 111-12 (Tex. App. 2000) (discussing the Texas Medical Liability and
Insurance Improvement Act and stating that the original act, "passed in 1977, sought to address a
'medical malpractice insurance crisis in the State of Texas"' (citation omitted)); Sokol, supra
note 80, at 445--48 (discussing responses to the malpractice crisis, including arbitration, screening
panels, and proposing the greater use of countersuit litigation to alleviate the crisis). See
generally infra Part V.C (discussing various provisions that could be adopted to encourage
settlement of meritorious cases and to block frivolous claims in veterinary malpractice cases).
Constitutional challenges to these state tort refonn acts followed, with courts split on their
validity. RobertS. Peck et al., Tort Reform 1999: A Building Without a Foundation, 27 FLA. Sr.
U. L. REv. 397, 416-19 (2000) (discussing constitutional rights that are arguably impacted by a
tort refonn act passed in Florida in 1999); Studdert, supra note 106, at 241--45 (discussing
constitutional challenges to tort reform acts). Some courts have found that key provisions of the
statutes were invalid based on state constitutional principles of due process, equal protection, jury
trials, or open courts. DOBBS, supra note Ill, at 526-27; Studdert, supra note I 06, at 243 (citing
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tort reform at the state level, efforts have been made to pass federal
114
legislation to address the crisis.
In comparison to medical as well as other professional malpractice
claims, the veterinary profession appears to be in a relatively good
position. As discussed above, insurance rates for veterinary malpractice
have been steady over the last decade, unlike medical and legal
115
The veterinary malpractice insurance industry has
malpractice rates.
not made distinctions by geographic location and is not as practice
specific as other professions are. Given this information, why should
there be any concern over the current standards that are applied in
veterinary malpractice actions?
First, from the perspective of
veterinarians, there has been an increase in malpractice claims, and
there are reports of settlements with damages in higher amounts than
116
Veterinarians have concerns
was customarily found in the past.
about the litigation system similar to those of physicians. Second, from
the perspective of clients, the remedies available under the current
system do not reflect the importance of the relationship between
1
17
Finally, for both sides
humans and their animal companions.

to Garty T. Schwartz, Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modem American Tort Law,
26 GA. L. REV. 601,683 n.435 (1992)).
114. The most recent federal legislation is the Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely
Healthcare ("HEALTH") Act of 2002. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002). Section 2 of the
HEALTH Act lists the effects on interstate commerce and federal spending to support the Act.
Supporters of the HEALTH Act say that federal legislation providing damage caps in health care
lawsuits is necessary because the rising insurance premiums cause physicians in high·risk
specialties to leave their specialty or move to states that have caps. A report by the Department of
Health and Human Services states that the federal cap could cut patients' medical costs by as
much as 30o/o. MacDonald, supra note 108. The HEALTH Act provides for a standard threeyear statute of limitations (or one year after discovery) to encourage speedy resolution of claims.
H.R. 4600, § 3. The HEALTH Act provides that full economic losses may be recovered but caps
non-economic damages at $250,000 for each occurrence. /d. § 4. The cap on non-economic
damages applies "regardless of the number of parties against whom the action is brought or the
number of separate claims or actions brought with respect to the same occurrence." /d. Punitive
damages are also capped at the greater of double the economic damages awarded or $250,000.
/d. § 7(b). Finally there are provisions governing attorneys' fees and the disclosure of collateral
source benefits. /d. §§ 5-6.
115. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text (discussing veterinary malpractice
insurance rates in comparison to medical malpractice rates); supra note 103 (noting the increase
in legal malpractice rates).
116. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 43 (discussing an increase in veterinary claims and
media reports of damage awards that are higher than market value). Malpractice carriers are
similarly in a potentially precarious position. Although they can spread risk among many
veterinarians, these companies are also at risk of at least short-tenn losses if numerous significant
damage awards are assessed against their insured before the companies are able to take such
losses into account in their pricing.
117. See supra notes 2-8 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between humans
and companion animals).

2004]

Valuation in Veterinary Malpractice

501

involved in these types of claims, there is a growing uncertainty about
the remedies that are available. Providing more consistency in the
damages available in these cases allows both parties to understand fully
the ramifications of their actions if malpractice occurs and, if necessary,
to adjust their behavior accordingly.

III. VETERINARY MALPRACTICE
The goals of tort actions are to "compensate victims, affirm social
118
values, and deter wrongdoers."
Two primary public policies
supporting the application of malpractice ,p rinciples to veterinarians are
to protect the public and to discourage unqualified individuals from
119
representing themselves as qualified veterinarians.
It is important to
120
If a
distinguish between claims of malpractice and negligence.
veterinarian is acting in a manner outside of his or her professional
121
capacity, a normal negligence standard will be used.
An example of
these types of actions relating to animals include veterinarians providing
118. Debra Squires-Lee, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Companion Animals in
Tort, 10 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1059, 1062 (1995). There is increasing evidence that medical
malpractice lawsuits do not reduce medical errors. Barry Manuel, A Threat to Reducing Medical
Errors, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 31, 2001, at Al5 (reporting on studies of the effect of malpractice
suits and stating that "medical malpractice suits neither improve medical care nor offer justice to
most injured patients"), available at 2001 WL 3926734.
119. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 16.
120. One reason it is important to distinguish between negligence and malpractice actions is
that if the lawsuit is based in negligence (rather than malpractice) expert medical testimony will
not be required. Moses v. Richardson, No. 0035312,2001 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1154, at *8
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2001) (affinning judgment against veterinarians when a horse was
seriously injured during a treadmill procedure); Savo v. Kazlauska, No. CV-9501274438, 1999
Conn. Super. LEXIS 314, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 5, 1999) (denying summary judgment for
a veterinarian in a negligence action where a horse kicked the plaintiff when the veterinarian
argued as an affinnative defense that the cause of action sounded in veterinary malpractice and
thus required an expert to set the applicable standard of care); Smith v. Hugo, 714 So. 2d 467,
468 (Aa. Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (affirrning verdict in favor of a client who was bitten by cat during
vaccination and finding that the jury instruction for ordinary neglige,nce was appropriate).
Veterinarians are also sued under various other theories, such as misrepresentation, Bobin v.
Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *8, *11 (E.D. Pa. May 17, 1995)
(alleging, among other things, misrepresentation in connection with recordkeeping in a negligent
post-operative care case); breach of contract, Brumfield v. Richardson, No. 0036348, 2002 Cal.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 3841, at *2 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2002) (alleging breach of an oral
agreement relating to the castration of a horse); and violation of a state's deceptive trade practices
act, Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (alleging a violation of the Texas
deceptive trade practices act over a statement made by a veterinarian that he "would be able to
adequately handle" a neutering procedure). See generally L. Leon Geyer, Malpractice and
Liability, 23 VETERINARY CLINICS N. AM: SMALL ANIMAL PRAC. 1027 (1993) (discussing and
distinguishing malpractice and negligence theories of liability for veterinarians).
121. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237; see also McAdams v. Faulk, No. CA011350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *7 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (distinguishing between
general negligence and malpractice claims).
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122
services.

boarding facilities or transportation
Veterinarians also may
be subject to claims of negligence if a client is injured (often bitten)
123
while the veterinarian treats the client's animal.
In addition,
veterinarians can be subject to negligence claims not relating to animals,
124
such as slip and fall actions on their property.
Malpractice claims are appropriate if the issues relate to specialized
skills not ordinarily possessed by lay people specifically, the medical
125
Essentially, malpractice is a specialized
skills of the veterinarian.
professional negligence or "bad practice due to a lack of skill or the
126
Initially, claims based on malpractice applied
failure to apply it."
only to specific professionals such as doctors and lawyers. 127 Many
courts have applied the malpractice standards established for doctors by
128
analogy to veterinarians, even without specific statutory authority.
122. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237; see also Harold W. Hannah, Veterinarians
as Bailees, 216 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1068 (2000) (discussing the standard of care for
bailees).
123. See Countryman v. Lester, 183 N.E.2d 727, 728 (Mass. 1962) (holding that a veterinarian
was not liable in a negligence action for bite injuries inflicted on the plaintiff-client by her cat
during the cat' s treatment); Branks v. Kern, 359 S.E.2d 780, 783 (N.C. 1987) (finding that a
veterinarian was not liable under a negligence theory when the client's cat bit her during the eat's
treatment). Professors Favre and Borchelt report that, according to one insurance company,
"during the 1990s injuries to humans represented 18% of the claims against veterinarians."
FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 247 n.l2. Dr. Soave reports that about 20% of the 2000
malpractice and negligence cases brought to court against veterinarians each year involve injuries
to human beings that are caused by animals under the care of such veterinarians. SOAVE, supra
note 14, at 21. Damage awards can be significant, especially in cases where injuries have
occurred in connection with the treatment of horses. Dinsmore, supra note 64, at 1021 (stating
that 13.7% of injuries to humans were caused by horses but the costs associated with such claims
equal 41.4% of the total incurred losses). The breakdown for injuries from other animals is as
follows: 39.6% of the injuries and 19.7o/o of the costs are caused by dogs and 28.8o/o of the
injuries and 15.6% of the costs are caused by cats. /d. These types of cases could be considered
malpractice rather than simple negligence if the harm occurs because of the type or manner in
which the veterinarian applies medical treatment; however, the focus of this Article is on the
damages that arise due to the injury or death of the patients rather than clients or others who may
be involved in the treatment process.
124. See, e.g., Hallberg v. Flat Creek Animal Clinic, 483 S.E.2d 671 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(illustrating this type of action in an unsuccessful negligence claim against a veterinary clinic for
injuries suffered when a client fell on a ramp leading out of the clinic).
125. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237.
126. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 14. Malpractice may be willful as well as negligent. /d.
127. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 236.
128. Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 490, 492 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing to Louisiana cases that
adopted the medical malpractice standard for veterinarian malpractice prior to the adoption of
statutory provisions clarifying the standard); Williamson v. Prida, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 868, 872 (Ct.
App. 1999) (applying a medical malpractice standard of care to veterinary malpractice and citing
to other courts that held the same); Price v. Brown, 680 A.2d 1149, 1152 (Pa. 1996) (extending
professional negligence concepts to veterinary medicine); see also Harold W. Hannah, What Is
the Standard of Care for a Veterinarian and Does Departure from It Always Spell Liability?, 218
J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1090 (2001). Several early cases stated that a claim for
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There are still a few states where courts have been reluctant to apply
129
"malpractice" standards to veterinarians without statutory authority.
One basis used to reject the application of malpractice standards to
veterinarians is that the patient-physician relationship (or presumably
the attorney-client relationship) that exists at the core of a malpractice
130
claim is not found in veterinary medicine.
Instead there is a
relationship between the veterinarian and the client who in turn owns
the patient.
Presumably, since animals are considered personal
property, these courts would find the relationship between a customer
and automobile mechanic more analogous. Just as a car does not have
the ability to sue a mechanic, an animal does not have the ability to sue
131
The client, who holds a legal interest in the
his or her veterinarian.
animal, maintains the right to sue over the injury or destruction of his or
her property as animals currently do not have standing to bring suits on
132
their own behalf in any situation.
Notwithstanding these cases, unless otherwise indicated, the
discussion in this Article centers on the special type of negligence based
veterinary malpractice was made without clarifying the standards to be set. See, e.g., Conner v.
Winton, 8 Ind. 289, 289 (1856) (describing the case as one in which Connor sued Winton for
unskillfully treating a horse). The Conner case is described by one author as the "first
malpractice case in the United States against a veterinarian." SOAVE, supra note 14, at 13. Other
early cases applied a professional standard of care without further comment. Barney v. Pinkham,
45 N. W. 694, 694 (Neb. 1890) (stating that a veterinary surgeon is bound to use "such reasonable
skill, diligence, and attention as may be ordinarily expected of persons in that profession").
129. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Conklin, 669 N.E.2d 563, 564 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (declining to
extend a malpractice statute of limitations to veterinarians and citing to a line of Ohio cases in
which the courts refused to extend the definition of malpractice to professions not enumerated in
statutes). But see Bowles v. Singh, No. CA99-I0-094, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *7 (Ohio
Ct. App. July 31, 2000) (applying the standard of care of a "veterinarian of ordinary skill, care
and diligence"); Turner v. Sinha, 582 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (applying a
professional standard of care to a claim of negligence by a veterinarian).
130. Southhall v. Gabel, 277 N.E.2d 230, 232 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971) (discussing the physicianpatient relationship between the veterinarian and animal and stating that "[u]ntil the [Ohio]
Supreme Court speaks, veterinarians are not included in the definition of malpractice").
Notwithstanding the fact that malpractice would not be applicable, Ohio courts have used
analogies between injuries to persons and injuries to animals in negligence actions. Southall v.
Gabel, 293 N.E.2d 891, 894 (Franklin County, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972) (finding that where alleged
damage to a horse is an injury that results in physical or mental disability, it is necessary to prove
the causal connection between the injury and disability in the same way as when the injury is to a
person and such causal connection must be established by the opinion of competent medical
witnesses); see also Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (stating that the
court would adopt the standard applied to physicians and surgeons in medical malpractice cases
for veterinary negligence cases). But see Pruitt v. Box, 984 S.W.2d 709, 711 (Tex. App. 1998)
(rejecting the Downing analysis and applying a general negligence standard utilizing a standard of
care "applicable to a professional of ordinary skill and care in similar communities").
131. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 68-79 (discussing the legal status
of animals and the possibility of treating animals as "persons" for limited purposes).
132. /d. at 79-83 (analyzing the issue of standing as it relates to animals).
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on the professional medical skills of the veterinarian that result in injury
or harm to a patient, whether the standard is set by analogy to medical
133
malpractice or as "professional negligence."
Just as with other tort actions, the plaintiff will have the burden of
proving the essential elements of the claim. In a malpractice action, the
elements are as follows: (a) the veterinarian owed a duty of care toward
the animal, (b) the veterinarian did not conforrn to the standard of
conduct required by those in the profession, (c) such non-conforming
conduct is the proximate cause of the injury or harm, and (d) the injury
134
or harm resulted in damages to the plaintiff.
The damages that arise
are due to either the injury or harm to the property of the client (the
animal) or to the client as an individual.

A. Standard of Care
Of these elements, an issue that some courts are continuing to
struggle with is the applicable standard of care in veterinary malpractice
cases. As stated above, the standards used for medical malpractice
cases are often applied by analogy to veterinary malpractice cases;
however, significant differences in the professions may impact the
135
standard.
Clearly, the treatment a veterinarian will provide varies depending on
136
the animal involved.
The type and value of the animal will control
137
the treatment provided to the anima1.
An animal that is used for food
production will receive different treatment from a beloved animal
•
com panton.
The nature of the patients also impacts the level of treatment. Many
veterinarians treat several different species of animals with a wide
138
spectrum of problems.
Communication is limited with the patients so
133. See Pruitt, 984 S.W.2d at 711 (applying a general negligence standard utilizing a
standard of care "applicable to a professional of ordinary skill and care in similar communities").
134. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 237.
135. See King, supra note 95, at 6.
136. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 15.
137. /d.
138. /d.; see also AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N, VETERINARY MARKET STATISTICS, at
http://www.avma.org/membshp/marketstats/usvets.asp (Sept. 2002) (showing the breakdown of
practice areas for veterinarians, with the majority of private clinical veterinarians designating
their practices as "small animal exclusive" or "small animal predominant"). The implication of
the treatment of multiple species appears to be that the veterinarian's knowledge of each species
may be lessened. The treatment of multiple species, as well as the extreme variations in size and
weight, make it more difficult to detennine proper medication dosages, increasing the likelihood
that claims will be brought because the drugs were improperly prescribed or administered.
Harold W. Hannah, Veterinary Medical Malpractice and Medical Malpractice: Some Parallels
and Differences, 202 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1819, 1820 (1993). One implication for
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it can be more difficult to define problems. 139 Another obvious
difference is the legal and acceptable use of euthanasia on animals, as
well as the economic limitations applied to the treatment of many
animals. 140
One articulation of the standard of care that is commonly applied to
veterinary malpractice claims is whether
the injury complained of was caused by the doing of a particular thing
that a veterinarian of ordinary skill, care and diligence would not have
done under like or similar circumstances, or by the failure or omission
to do some particular thing that such a veterinarian would have done
under like or similar circumstances. 141
Essentially, the standard of care is one set by the actions of other
professionals in the same position, rather than a standard set by
laypersons. 142 It is important to recognize that the standard is not set by
the actions of the most skilled veterinarians-merely ones that are
considered average or normai. 14 3
Expert testimony is generally necessary in order to determine
whether a veterinarian has complied with this professional standard of
care. 144 As in other negligence actions, research literature and other
the lower expectation for the care provided by a "general practitioner" is that specialists have
been held to a higher standard of care. See infra note 159 and accompanying text. The
percentage of general practitioners in the veterinary profession is higher than the percentage of
general practitioners in the medical profession. Hannah, supra, at 1820.
139. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 15.
140. /d.; WILSON, supra note 14, at 137.
141. Turner v. Sinha, 582 N.E.2d 1018, 1021 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (setting forth a standard in
a case that actually was not defined as malpractice); see also King, supra note 95, at 10.
142. King, supra note 95, at 12-18.
143. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238; see also Barney v. Pinkham, 45 N.W. 694,
694 (Neb. 1890) (stating that a veterinary surgeon "does not contract to use the highest degree of
skill, nor an extraordinary amount of diligence, but to exercise a reasonable degree of knowledge,
diligence and attention").
144. WILSON, supra note 14, at 137; see also Jahn v. Equine Servs., PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 38893 (6th Cir. 2000) (discussing expert testimony in a veterinary malpractice action); Bekkemo v.
Erickson, 242 N.W. 617, 618-19 (Minn. 1932) (discussing expert witnesses and expert witness
fees in a case alleging negligence by a veterinarian); Zimmerman v. Robertson, 854 P.2d 338, 340
(Mont. 1993) (finding that expert testimony is necessary to establish the standard of care in a
veterinary malpractice action); Fackler v. Genetzky, 638 N.W.2d 521, 528 (Neb. 2002) (stating
that "[m]edical expert testimony regarding causation ... must be stated as being at least
' probable,' in other words, more like ly than not" in a veterinary malpractice case); Durocher v.
Rochester Equine Clinic, 629 A.2d 827, 829 (N.H. 1993) (finding that expert testimony from a
veterinarian is necessary to prove the elements of causation and harm in veterinary malpractice
cases); McGee v. Smith, 107 S.W.3d 725 (Tex. App. 2003) (discussing the standard of care and
the need for expert testimony in a veterinary malpractice action). Note that if a locality rule is
applied, it may be difficult to obtain this expert testimony. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34,
at 239. Plaintiffs may also be required to fulfill statutory requirements, such as the filing of an
expert affidavit, to proceed with veterinary malpractice actions. Collins v. Newman, 517 S.E.2d
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sources, such as warning labels, can assist in establishing the standard
145
of care.
Additionally, state veterinary medical associations or
146
veterinary medical practice acts can establish the standard of care.
Although the A VMA has not adopted specific practice standards, it does
have fourteen general guidelines for practice, and the AVMA's PLIT
has a survey that lists twenty-nine desirable practices in a veterinary
147
An inference can also be made that a veterinarian has not met
clinic.
the applicable standard of care if the actions alleged are the types listed
148
in statutes that support the revocation of a veterinarian's license.
Notwithstanding the application of a professional standard of care, it
is possible to establish a prima facie case if the "very nature of the acts
149
The
complained of bespeaks improper treatment and malpractice."
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied in veterinary malpractice·
cases, but only if the injury complained of is of a kind that does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, and other responsible
150
An example of
causes are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence.
the application of this doctrine is an injury resulting from a veterinarian
leaving a surgical instrument or sponge in an animal that has undergone
151
surgery.

100, 101-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that section 9-11-9.1 of the Georgia Annotated Code
required the filing of an expert affidavit in a veterinary malpractice case in which the plaintiff
alleged that instruments were left inside a dog during a spaying procedure).
145. Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 4907 493 (5th Cir. 1986) (discussing research literature
and product manufacturer recommendations to support a finding that a veterinarian was not
negligent in the administration of a medication); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa
1973) (using contraindications enclosed with a vaccine to set the standard of care in a lawsuit
over the deaths of pregnant gilts after vaccination); Carter v. La. State Univ., 520 So. 2d 383, 388
(La. 1988) (finding that medical records kept by veterinary students supported the testimony of
the plaintiff).
146. Harold W. Hannah, Common Law and Statutory Defenses to a Veterinary Medical
Malpractice Action, 206 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1703, 1703 (1995) [hereinafter
Hannah, Defenses].
147. Harold W. Hannah, Establishing the Standard of Care, 208 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
ASS'N 1034 (1996) [hereinafter Hannah, Standard of Care]. Note that the ability of a licensing
board to set the standard of care has been challenged with mixed results from the courts. ld, at
1035.
148. /d. at 1034.
149. Mathew v. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (App. Term. 1998) (citing to Restrepo v.
State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536 (Ct. Cl. 1989), and finding that no expert is necessary to explain that a
veterinarian should x-ray a dog if she suspects that the dog has swallowed something).
150. Mires v. Evans, No. 82-4436, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *31-*33 (E.D. Pa. July
21, 1986) (discussing the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur). The "other
responsible causes" would include the conduct of the plaintiff and other third persons. /d. at *32*33.
151. Hannah, Standard of Care, supra note 147, at 1035.
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One rule courts have utilized to set the standard of care is referred to
as the "locality rule." 152 The locality rule evaluates the conduct of a
professional by considering the professional standards in the geographic
153
area where the professional practices.
The geographic area may be as
154
narrow as the immediate locality or as large as a national standard.
Courts have also considered the care practiced in a particular or like
155
community as one of the elements to be used in setting the standard.
The locality rule can impact liability by limiting the pool of available
experts to opine on the applicable standard, and such standard may be
156
narrower than in a jurisdiction that applies a national standard.
Just
as with the medical profession, with the increasing access to
information and continuing professional education requirements, it
appears the veterinary profession should adopt a more unifonn
157
standard.
A more general uniform standard promotes higher levels of
158
competence within the profession.
Notwithstanding any applicable geographic limitation, veterinarians
who hold themselves out as specialists in a particular aspect of
veterinary practice should be held to the standards of other specialists in
159
that field.
One difficulty in determining the standard of care for this
area of malpractice is that some practitioners specialize in a species or
type of veterinary practice while others are actually board certified
160
Regardless of board certification, veterinarians who are
specialists.
considered specialists will likely be held to a higher standard of care
161
than generalists.
152. King, supra note 95, at 18- 21.
153. ld. at 19.
154. /d. An interim standard can be referred to as the "same or similar" locality. /d.
155. Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 716 (Iowa 1973) (rejecting the locality rule and
stating that the standard of care practiced in a particular community can be one of the elements
considered though it is not conclusive).
156. King, supra note 95, at 19. See generally FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239
(discussing policy considerations supporting a general standard of national or statewide scope
rather than a more narrow locality rule).
157. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239. Professors Favre and Borchelt would
caution that an exception to such a standard could be related to access to advanced equipment. /d.
The trend is to move away from the application of a narrow locality rule. WILSON, supra note 14,
at 136; see also Carter v. La. State Univ. , 520 So. 2d 383, 387 (La. 1988) (rejecting the use of a
locality standard for a malpractice case involving a veterinary specialist).
158. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 239.
159. /d.; King, supra note 95, at 17; see also Restrepo v. State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536, 540 41 (Ct.
Cl. 1989) (discussing the application of the locality rule and applying a standard of care set by
other racetrack veterinarians).
160. WILSON, supra note 14, at 139.
161. /d. at 140. Note that generalists can also be found negligent if they fail to refer a patient
to a specialist in some situations. Harold W. Hannah, Knowing the Limits of One's Skill-
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There is also a temporal frame of reference used to evaluate
162
professional services.
The standard of care is one that existed at the
time of the alleged malpractice. 163 Veterinarians, like other
professionals, are not held to standards developed or adopted by
practitioners subsequent to the treatment at issue.
It is important to note that the standard of care is reasonable
164
professional competence, not merely errors in j-udgment.
There is no
guarantee of a particular result of treatment (unless a guarantee or
165
warranty is independently provided).
There is no presumption of
166
malpractice even if injury or death occurs after treatment.
Malpractice can be found with omissions in treatment as well as the
167
commission of acts relating to treatment.
Although omissions in
treatment occur more frequently than the commission of incorrect
treatment, it is generally easier to prove malpractice if there has been
168
improper treatment.
Given the role of clients in determining the
extent of medical treatment, it can be difficult to measure the
1
appropriate level of treatment. 69

B. Types of Malpractice Claims
Malpractice claims have been based on allegations of improper
treatment in a variety of areas. Unskillful surgeries and improper post170
surgical care are common claims.
Problems with vaccinations also

Referrals, 210 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 31, 31 (1997). If a veterinarian calls in a
consultant and is guided by such consultant's advice, the veterinarian will be liable for the
consultant's negligence as well as his or her own negligence. /d. at 32.
162. King, supra note 95, at 21.
163. /d.; see, e.g., Mires v. Evans, No. 82-4436, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *30 (E.D.
Pa. July 21, 1986) (stating that in judging the degree of skill, regard is to be had to the advanced
state of the profession at the time); Williams v. Reynolds, 263 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (N.C. Ct. App.
1980) (discussing the excluded testimony of a veterinarian who did not live in the county during
the month that an alleged malpractice occurred).
164. King, supra note 95, at 22.
.,
165. See FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238 ("The standard does not make the
veterinarian an insurer of the recovery of an animal.").
166. /d. at 238; see also Mires, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22524, at *29 (stating that "no
presumption or inference of negligence arises merely because the medical treatment of a
racehorse yields a bad result").
167. WILSON, supra note 14, at 136-37.
168. /d. at 137.
169. /d.
170. E.g., Bobin v. Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
May 17, 1995) (alleging negligent post-operative care); Collins v. Newman, 517 S.E.2d 100, 10 I
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (alleging that a veterinarian left medical instruments inside a dog during a
spaying procedure); Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 610 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (alleging
negligence in spaying a dog); Zimmern1an v. Robertson, 854 P.2d 338, 339 (Mont. 1993)
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171
claims.

have frequently formed the basis for malpractice
Similarly, it
is not uncommon for courts to consider malpractice claims alleging the
172
misuse or improper administration of medications or drugs.
Not only have claims been based on allegations of improper
treatment but the failure to inform a client of the availability of alternate
treatments and disclose the risks involved in treatments can be used to
173
For example, the failure to inform an
support malpractice claims.
owner about the necessary care for an animal after its release from a
174
veterinarian's care can support a malpractice action.
Malpractice
claims also have arisen from alleged errors in the confinement or
restraint of animals during treatment, as restraint can be considered an
175
integral part of the practice of veterinary medicine.
Occasionally, a veterinarian can be held liable if he or she does not
follow up on treatment when the veterinarian has a duty to do so, either
by circumstances or because he or she has agreed to continue
(alleging negligent surgical and post-surgical care of a colt after castration); DeCurtis-Slifkin v.
Kolbert, 668 N.Y.S.2d 949, 949 (App. Div~ 1989) (alleging negligence in the discharge of an
animal while it was partially sedated); Williams v. Reyonds, 263 S.E.2d 853, 853 (N.C. Ct. App.
1980) (alleging negligent post-surgical care of a castrated horse); Downing v. Gully, 915 S.W.2d
181, 183 (Tex. App. 1996) (alleging negligence in the administration of anesthesia, in a neutering
operation).
171. E.g., Grei ves v. Greenwood,. 550 N .E.2d 334, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (alleging the
negligent injection of cattle with a brucellosis vaccine); Ruden v. Hansen, 206 N.W.2d 713, 715
(Iowa 1973) (alleging that a veterinarian used an improper vaccination on pregnant gilts); Phillips
v. Leuth, 204 N.W. 301, 302 (Iowa 1925) (alleging blood poisoning caused by improper
vaccination); see also Duane Flemming, The Potential for Liability in the Use and Misuse of
Veterin(lry Vaccines, 31 VETERINARY CLINICS N.. AM.: SMALL ANIMAL PRAC. 515 (200 l)
(discussing liability issues relating to the use of vaccinations).
172. E.g., Ladnier v. Norwood, 781 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1986) (alleging improper
administration of medication containing vitamin E); Kerbow v. Bell, 259 P.2d 317, 318 (Okla.
1953) (alleging that a dip used to treat mange_ was too strong, causing the death of dogs);
Erickson v. Webber, 237 N.W. 558, 559 (S.D. 1931) (alleging improper administration of a
wonning treatment, causing the death of sheep).
173. Emes Stable v. Univ. of Penn., No. 85-5402, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS2972, at *I (E.D.
Pa. Apr~ 4,. 1988) (alleging malpractice when a veterinarian operated on a horse before informing
its owner of all alternative available treatments); Hemming, supra note 171, at 518-20
(discussing infonned consent issues and stating that the current inforrned consent standard is the
"reasonable pati_ent standard").
174. Hannah, supra note 41, at 1419. Malpractice claims may also arise from dispensation of
prescription drugs, security for prescription drugs, and the failure to warn a client if the client
assists in an examination, as there is a risk that the client could be injured. Id. In addition~ there
may be circumstances in which a veterinarian must warn someone or report that an animal has a
communicable disease. /d. at 1420.
175. Beck v. Henkle-Craig Livestock Co., 88 S.E. 865, 866 (N.C. 1916) (alleging malpractice
in the way in which a mule was put into a stall in preparation for surgery); Harold W. Hannah,
Malpractice Implications of Animal Restraint, 214 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 41, 41
(1999) (discussing cases in which restraint was part of a malpractice claim). Improper restraint
may also contribute to human injury. /d.
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176

treatment.
It is important to note that veterinarians are under no legal
177
obligation to accept a case, even in an emergency.
This does not
mean that a veterinarian's refusal to accept a case will not violate the
ethical standards set by the veterinary community, just that a legal cause
178
of action does not arise from such a refusal.
It is only when a
relationship has been established for the care. of an animal that a
veterinarian can be held liable for the abandonment of such animal's
179
care.
Given the increased availability of specialists, a veterinarian
can also be liable if he or she fails to refer a client to a specialist in
18
appropriate circumstances. 0
.

.

.

.

C. Defenses to Malpractice Claims
Just like defendants in other actions brought under tort law,
veterinarians have a variety of common defenses-to malpractice claims.
The negation of any of the elements of this cause of action defeats the
malpractice claim. Thus, the veterinarian could show that he or she was
not under a duty of care to the patient b.e cause no relationship had been
entered into at the time of the alleged malpractice. Obviously, the lack
176. Restrepo v. State, 550 N.Y.S.2d 536, 538 (Ct. Cl. 1989) (alleging negligence when a
racetrack veterinarian left a needle in a horse's jugular vein); Boom v. Reed, 23 N.Y.S. 421, 422
(Gen. Term 1893) (alleging that a veterinarian was negligent when he did not return as· promised
to treat a sick horse).
177. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21. Some states have adopted Good Samaritan laws to protect
veterinarians who take on the care of an animal in emergency situations. E.g., MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 333.18826 (West 2001) (limiting liability for civil damages to acts amounting to
gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct when providing treatment to an animal where
the ownership of such animal is unknown at the time of the treatment); N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 6705a (McKinney 2001 & Supp. 2004) (providing_ that veterinarians who provide emergency
treatment outside of an animal hospital or clinic will not be liable for damages relating to the
animal's injury or death).
178. FAVRE & BORCHELT, supra note 34, at 238; see, e.g., In re Kerlin, 376 A.2d 939, 94243 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (appealing the decision of the Board of Veterinary Medical
Examiners' (the "Board") that a veterinarian was guilty of "gross malpractice or gross neglect" in
a case in which his office assistant allegedly refused to treat an ill kitten). In the Kerlin case, the
Board· held "that a veterinarian is expected to exhibit professional interest, compassion and
empathy." Id. at 942. The Board detennined that a veterinarian who does not make a preliminary
inquiry to detennine the need for emergency care or humane treatment would substantially
deviate from the standards of the profession. /d. at 942-43. The court found, however, that the
lack of qualities such as compassion and empathy would not "standing alone" constitute gross
malpractice or· gross neglect. /d. at 944. The court found that even if it adopted the Board's
definition of grossly neglectful treatment, there was no proof that the veterinarian "refused to treat
or examine, or ... [that] he did not allow his employees to examine or treat the kitten." /d.
179. SOAVE, supra note 14, at 21;_ cf. RICHARD M. PATTERSON, HARNEY'S MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE§ 5.8 (4th ed. 1999) ("It is a basic rule in the medical profession that having once
undertaken the care of a patient, a physician may not neglect him.").
180. Geyer, supra note 120, at 1034 (discussing theories underlying veterinary malpractice
claims).
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of this element is more likely to be raised in situations involving the
omission by a veterinarian; however, as stated above, veterinarians are
not legally required to treat any animal before they have accepted a
181
case.
The second element, the veterinarian's failure to conform to
the standard of conduct, can be rebutted by proving that the veterinarian
did not act negligently. The defendant veterinarian can use the same
182
types of evidence as the plaintiff can.
A defendant can neutralize the third element by showing either that
the harm would have occurred regardless of the veterinarian's actions or
that there was another reason for the injury. For example, a veterinarian
may be able to show that the client did not medicate or care for the
183
animal as the veterinarian had prescribed.
The final element, that
injury or harrn has occurred, is at the heart of this Article. As discussed
below, there are currently limitations on the value placed on animals;
184
thus, the financial harm to the client is usually quite limited.
Regardless, to reduce any damages, a veterinarian can show that the
injury or harm is not as significant as the client alleges.
In addition to fighting the lawsuit based on the elements of the claim,
185
veterinarians also have other possible defenses.
Plaintiffs must file
their claims for veterinary malpractice within the appropriate
186
statute of limitations.
State statutes generally set limitation

181. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text (noting that veterinarians are not legally
obligated to accept an animal for care).
182. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing evidentiary uses to make or
defend a case); supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that can be used in
veterinary malpractice cases to establish the requisite standard of care).
183. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing the use of contributory and
comparative negligence as defenses).
184. See generally infra Part IV (discussing the types of damages that are awarded in
veterinary malpractice actions).
185. Under certain circumstances, it may be possible to use evidence of a habit as a defense in
veterinary malpractice actions. Harold W. Hannah, Habit as a Defense in a Veterinary
Malpractice Suit, 211 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. Ass'N 1129, 1129 (1997). Habit can be defined
as "how an individual responds to a recurring situation." /d. A habit can be something that is
either never done or always done, but the party asserting the habit must show that the conduct is
semi-automatic or perfonned as a matter of course. !d.
186. See, e.g., Storozuk v. W.A. Butler Co., 203 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ohio Ct. C .P. 1964)
(finding that the practice of veterinary medicine would be included within the definition of
malpractice for purposes of a one-year statute of limitations and sustaining a demurrer that barred
action brought more than one year after services were perfonned); Satterwhite v. Weedn, 415
S.W.2d 445, 446 47 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967) (upholding an instructed verdict on grounds that the
suit was barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitations). Veterinarian defendants may be
required to plead the statute of limitations as an affinnative defense. See, e.g., Lobrillo v.
Brokken, 837 So. 2d I 059, 1061 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that the statute of limitations must
be raised in the answer as an affirrnative defense in a veterinary malpractice action).
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187
periods.

Statutory language is not always easy to interpret and can
become_a focus in the case. For example, in a veterinary malpractice
case discussing the applicable statute of limitations, a Minnesota Court
of Appeals found that the statute of limitations be-g an to run on the date
when treatment for a particular condition ceased, rather than at the time
188
of the negligent action or omission causing the injury.
The court
explained that the "termination of treatment" rule is used in medical
malpractice cases because- the trust relationship between patient and
physician inhibits the patient's ability to discover malpractice during
189
treatment.
The same concerns were deemed to be equally present in
veterinary malpractice cases, as both physicians and veterinarians ''deal
190
with the investigation, prevention, cure and alleviation of disease."
The court found that animal owners rely on veterinarians during the
course of treatment to support the application of the termination of
191
treatment rule to veterinary malpractice cases.
Other defenses can be tailored to specific claims. For example, if a
veterinarian has evidence that a client granted infortned consent, a claim
192
based on the type of treatment selected could be defeated.
It may be
possible to argue that a client signed an exculpatory clause; however,
193
courts have been reluctant to enforce these types of clauses.
Some
states also have statutory provisions that provide for specialized
standards for professional negligence actions, and the failure to meet the
194
standards can be used to defeat these types of claims.
In claims that relate to injuries to humans, 195 the common law
196
defense of assumption of risk could be utilized.
The assumption of
risk defense requires the veterinarian to show that the plaintiff knew of
'

187. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.07(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (providing that all actions
against veterinarians must _c ommence within two years).
188. Berres v. Anderson, 561 N~W.2d 919, 922-23 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).

189. /d.
190. /d.
191. ld.

at 923.

192. Hannah, Defenses, supra note 146, at 1703 (discussing infonned consent).
193. /d. at 1703-04; see, e.g., Nikolic v. Seidenberg, 610 N.E.2d 177, 179-81 (Ill. Ct. App.
1993) (construing an exculpatory clause narrowly to allow a veterinary malpractice claim to
proceed)~

194. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114? 115 n.2 (Colo. 2001) (noting that the
client did not file a certificate of review as required by Colorado law in a counterclaim for
professional negligence); see also infra note 361 and accompanying text (noting statutory
provisions requiring special procedures for claims of professional malpractice).
195. See supra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing injuries to clients that occurred
during veterinarians' treatment of clients' animals). This issue is raised only because of the
significant number of such claims, although these claims are not the focus of this Article.
196. Hannah, Defenses~ supra note 146, at 1704~
"
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the risk involved in what he or she did (c.ommonly the plaintiff was
restraining or near the animal during treatment) and voluntarily assumed
197
the risk.
Assuming that a client is able to prove successfully that
veterinary malpractice occurred,-the next step in the process is to assess
damages in the case. 198
IV. DAMAGES
Just as with other animal law issues, deterrruning the value of animals
under the legal system has been the subject of increased legal
199
commentary in recent years.
What the commentary in this area
generally does not do is distinguish between intentional and negligent
torts. Nor does the commentary consider whether a veterinarian should
be held to a different standard of care given the veterin-a rian's status as a
professional and the fact that the client has entrusted an animal to the
veterinarian's care. By necessity, due to the limited case law in the
area, this Article will address damages available for the injury or death
of anitnals regardless of the circumstances surrounding the claim.
Where case law allows, the focus of the discussion of damages will be
on those cases involving veterinary malpractice.
.

.

197. Jd.
198. Justas with other lawsuits, a veterinarian may be able to countersue under a variety of
theories, including malicious prosecution, abuse of process, or breach of contract for unpaid fees.
See generally Sokol, supra note 80 (discussing the use of countersuits in medical malpractice
cases, most notably as a response to frivolous medical malpractice suits).
199. See, e.g., Peter Barton & Frances Hill, How Much Will You Receive in Damages from the
Negligent or Intentional Killing of Your Pet Dog or Cat?, 34 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 411 (1989)
(evalu~ting the market value approach and variations thereon to account for intrinsic measures of
companion animal value); Lynn A. Epstein, Resolving Confusion in Pet Owner Tort Cases:
Recognizing Pets' Anthropomorphic Qualities Under a Property Classification, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J.
31 (2001) (addressing issues of property value approaches to include other non-market value
qualities of pets to assess damages for loss of pets); Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note
1; Squires-Lee, supra note 118 (proposing that the valuation of companion animals should not be
wholly dependent upon a property classification); Waisman & Newel1, supra note 83; Steven M.
Wise, Recovery of Common lAw Damages for Emotional Distress, Loss of Society, and Loss of
Companionship for the Wrongful Death of a Cotnpariion Animal, 4 ANIMAL L. 33 ( 1998)
(proposing that compensation for loss of companion animals should parallel valuation and
compensation methods used in cases where parents have lost a small child); S. Joseph Piazza,
Note, Liability for the lnjU.ry and Destruction of Canines, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 78, 85-89 (1973)
(proposing legal refonn to protect companion animals and to allow recovery by owners for more
damages than just the market value of the pet); Janice M. Pintar, Comment, Negligent Infliction of

Emotional Distress and the Fair Market Value Approach in Wisconsin: The Case for Extending
Tort Protection to Companion Animals and Their <Avners, 2002 WIS. L. Rev. 735 (proposing
changes in tort law and the market value approach for companion animals); William C. Root,
Note, "Man's Best Friend".~ Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal
Classification of Companion Animals and Its Impact 011 Damages Recoverable for Their
Wrongful Death or Injury, 41 VILL. L. REv. 423 (2002) (arguing that companion pets should be
valued as family members). This issue is not a new one for legal commentators.
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A. Economic Damages
Traditionally, the only damages available in malpractice claims were
the economic damages that arose due to the injury or death of an
animal. Clients who are deprived of the use of an animal can be
c0mpensated for such loss, just as if any other piece of personal
property were damaged or destroyed. Courts historically have used
"fair market value" to establish the economic cost of an animal. 200 This
is based on the general rule that the value of person(l.l property is the
201
market value itrunediately before and after the injury.
A definition of
market value as stated in one veterinary malpractice case is
the amount that would be paid in cash by a willing buyer who desires
to buy, but is not required to buy, to· a willing seller who desires to
sell, but is under no necessity of selling. In considering market value,
you may consider the highest and best use to which the animal may
202
have been used.

If an animal is injured but not killed, the measure of damages is "the
difference between the fair market value of the animal before the injury
and its fair market value immediately after the injury." 203
Fair market value can be established in a number of ways. Certainly,
the purchase price of an animal can be used as evidence of the value of
204
the anima1.
Any specialized training or skill that an animal has can
2
5
be used for market value determination. 0
Damages for "future

200. Squires-Lee, supra note 118, at 1061.
201. See Collins v. Ubanoski, No. B 14-88-00461-CV, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *4
(Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 1989) (discussing the market value of a steer that died after a dehorning
procedure (citing Pasadena State Bank v. Isaac, 228 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex. 1950))); see also
Ponder v. Angel Animal Hosp., 762 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that ~'the
measure of damages to animals is their difference in fair market value before and after the injury"
in a case where a veterinarian negligently castrated a dog).
202. Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *4; see also Schrubbe v. Peninsula Veterinary
Serv. Inc., 552 N. W .2d 634, 636 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) ('"The basic measure of damages for the
destruction of livestock is the animal's market value·, determined by replacement cost, with an
appropriate reduction for any salvage valuen' (quoting Rosche v. Wayne Feed Div., Cont'l Grain
Co., 447 N.W.2d 94, 96 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989))).
203'. State v. Morison, 365 P.2d 266, 272 (Colo. 1961) (remanding for a new trial on damages
and finding that the plaintiffs were "entitled to a sum equal to the difference between the fair
market value of the herd before it contracted, paratuberculosis and its fair market value after it
became infected with the disease").
204. See Kenny v. Lesser, 722 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305~6 (App. Div. 2001) (reviewing evidence
that was utilized to show a race horse.' s value, including an offer to purchase the horse, and
declining to interfere with the fact finding function of the jury, which awarded $100,000 for the
death of the horse in a veterinary malpractice action); Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at
*5.
205. McDonald v. Ohio State Univ. Veterinary Hosp., 644 N.E.2d 750, 752 (Ohio Ct. C.l.
1994) (discussing the damages for the paralysis of a dog that subsequently was euthanized).
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conditions where they are reasonably certain to occur or exist in the
206
In the context of
future," such as potential earnings, can be awarded.
animals, a common type of future earnings would be the breeding
207
It is relatively
services to be provided by such animals.
straightforward to determine the damages for the loss of a food
208
For food
producing animal, as there is a market for such animals.
producing animals, damages have been claimed for lost income from
209
the production of products from the animals.
Notwithstanding the clear precedent that values animals under a fair
market value standard, several courts have utilized more flexible
standards in determining value though continuing to reference market
value as the usual standard. As one court stated, "[m]arket value is ...
210
a standard not a shackle."
Other examples of the use of different
valuations include cases in which market value cannot be obtained
211
An example of this more flexible standard is the
easily or feasibly.
case of McDonald v. Ohio State University Veterinary Hospital, in
which a highly trained and pedigreed German shepherd suffered
212
The court considered several factors in
paralysis after surgery.
determining the value of the dog, including specialized training, awards,
213
Expert testimony in
and titles, as well as the stud services of the dog.

206. /d. (discussing potential earnings for a pedigreed Gennan shepherd).
207. /d. (discussing stud fees for a pedigreed Gern1an shepherd).
208. Bekkemo v. Erickson, 242 N.W. 617, 617-18 (Minn. 1932) (setting a market value for
spring pigs, sows, and fall pigs and reiterating the standard used by the trial court that "the
measure of damages ... is the reasonable market value of those hogs which you are reasonably
certain would have been saved if the defendant had exercised that required degree of care, skill,
and diligence"). The Bekkemo court also noted that "such damages as here involved can never be
deternlined with absolute accuracy or mathematical certainty." /d. at 618.
209. See State v. Morison, 365 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1961) (setting forth the damages
requested for the loss of a dairy herd from disease allegedly caused by veterinary negligence,
including lost income and the use of dairy products and beet). The court in this case cautioned
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for losses that occurred after the cattle were sold,
or in this case compensation for the loss of the progeny of the sold cattle, as should be reflected in
the fair market value of the animal itself. /d. at 272-73. The plaintiffs were eligible to receive
damages based on the diminution in market value, and allowance of the additional items was
considered a fonn of double recovery. /d.; see also Collins, 1989 Tex. App. LEXIS 2739, at *5
(discussing the market value of a steer that died after a dehorning procedure and stating that the
potential meat value ranged from $300 to $500).
210. McDonald, 644 N.E.2d at 752 (discussing damages for the paralysis of a dog that
subsequently was euthanized).
21 L /d. (providing an example of a case that adopted a flexible quality standard instead of
using a market value approach to detennine the damages for the loss of an animal).
212. /d. at 751-52 (discussing damages in a case where the defendant filed a stipulation of
liability admitting that the surgery on the dog was negligent).
213. /d. at 752 (awarding damages of $5000 for the loss of the dog itself and potential
earnings from stud fees).
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$10,000.

McDonald placed the dog's .v alue between $0 and
Although the court began its analysis with market value, it referenced
the time used to train the dog, as well as the efforts of McDonald to
rehabilitate the paralyzed animal, and awarded $5000 in damages for
215
the loss of the dog.
Courts will also use alternative valuations if market value is "not
216
available or not accurate."
For example, in Hohenstein v. Dodds, the
Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that diseased pigs have no market
217
The Hohenstein court set as the proper measure of damages
value.
the following: "the difference between the value of the pigs as they
were on the date of the defendant's call, if they were to receive proper
treatment, and the value of those which survived defendant's
218
treatment. "
Occasionally plaintiffs demand damages consisting of the veterinary
219
Statutory
expenses incurred because of the tortious conduct.
provisions in some states provide for veterinary expenses to be used to
support damage awards. As an example, a Maryland statute provides
that the measure of damages in the tortious injury or death of an animal
(specifically a pet) is "the market value of the pet before the injury or
death or the reasonable cost of veterinary care, but not more than $5000
220
if such charge is greater."
Often the application of these statutes is
limited to service animals and the stated purpose is intended only to
provide restitution to the disabled persons being assisted by such

214. /d.
215. /d. This court, although applying a "more elastic standard," reiterated that
"[s]entimentality is not a proper element in the detennination of damages caused to animals." /d.
216. Hohenstein v. Dodds, 10 N.W.2d 236, 238 (Minn. 1943). The court also stated that
market value uis not the only measure of value." /d.
217. /d. (finding that Minnesota law prohibits the selling of animals with infectious or
contagious diseases, and that as a result, the pigs had no market value in their diseased condition).
218. /d.
219. Mathew v. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d 549, 550 (App. Tenn. 1998) (affiuning a modified
judgment consisting of the amount paid to a veterinarian for treatment where a court later found
that the veterinarian committed malpractice in such treatment); Bowles v. Singh, No. CA99-10094, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *3, *9 (Ohio Ct. App. July 31, 2000) (affinning a damage
award that included veterinary expenses in a veterinary malpractice case). Note that there were
several procedural problems with the veterinarian-defendant's assignments of error in Bowles;
thus, the trial court's presumption of an evidentiary basis for the damages award was affirmed.
Bowles, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 3410, at *8-*9. The court in Klinger declined to allow recovery
for a necropsy to detennine the cause of death and found that market value could have been used;
however, plaintiff did not introduce any evidence of the dog's value. Klinger, 686 N.Y.S.2d at
550. But see Stettner v. Graubard, 368 N.Y.S.2d 683, 684-85 (Harrison, N.Y. Town Ct. 1975)
(limiting the damages in a veterinary malpractice case to the animal's market value, despite the
fact that the veterinary costs were higher than such market value).
220. Mo. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-llO(b) (2002).
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221
animals.

The availability of this type of damage to a plaintiff in a
malpractice action will depend on the language of the statute, as it is not
uncommon that such acts exclude from coverage claims against
222
veterinarians.

B. Non-economic Damages
1. Emotional Distress (Intentional/Negligent)
In addition to damages based on the loss of an animal as personal
property, another claim often raised in connection with veterinary
malpractice is the intentional or negligent infliction of emotional
223
As there is growing literature discussing the
distress on the client.
bond between people and their animal companions, as well as greater
acknowledgement that the deaths of these animals have a significant
impact on people, it is not surprising that people are raising claims for
emotional distress relating to the injury or death of animals on a regular
224
basis.
The ability to recover damages for emotional distress depends on
widely varying state laws. Some states have allowed claims based on
damage to property, while others have held that the destruction of
225
property will not support claims of emotional distress.
States also
221. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE. §§ 600.2, 600.5 (West 1999) (providing restftution in the
amount of the veterinary bills and replacement cost of the assistance dog if the dog is disabled or
killed either by a person or another dog); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 13/10 (2002) {allowing economic
and non-economic recovery where economic damages include but are not limited to veterinary,
retraining, and replacement costs); N.Y. GEN OBLIG. LAW§ 11-107 (McKinney 2001) (providing
for damages consisting of veterinary costs, retraining or replacement costs, and lost wages or
damages due to the loss of mobility incurred while retraining or replacement takes place); OR.
REV. STAT. § 346.687 (2001) (allowing economic damages including temporary replacement
services, veterinary expenses, and any other cost and expense incurred as a result of the theft of or
injury to the animal); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 78-20-102 (2002) (providing for damages that included
veterinary expenses, replacement services, and costs incurred in recovering the assistance
animal).
222. See infra notes 283-87 and accompanying text (discussing statutes that allow noneconomic damages for the death or fatal injury of a domesticated dog or cat but may exclude
veterinarians (in actions for professional negligence) from their coverage).
223. A person who proximately causes harm is required to pay for damages regardless of the
nature of such damages under tort law. Squires-Lee, supra note 118, at 1062. This includes
damages for emotional distress even though these types of damages are more difficult to quantify.
/d.
224. See Huss, Co,npanion Animal Issues, supra note 7., at 211-12 (discussing the greater
attention and awareness given by courts to the grief process that people with companion animals
may experience when their companion animals die).
225. Compare Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 106~71 (Haw. 1981)
(allowing distress claims based on harm to property), with Fackler v. Genetzky, 595 N.W.2d 884,
891-92 (Neb. 1999) (finding that Nebraska law does not allow recovery for emotional damages
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create distinctions based on whether the conduct alleged is intentional
or negligent. Conduct usually must be extreme and outrageous in order
226
to support claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In
order to recover under the theory of negligent infliction of emotional
distress, plaintiffs in some states must be close relatives of the victim or
227
have been in fear of physical harm because of the conduct.
Recovery
for the negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress may also
be limited to those cases where the person alleging the distress is a
witness to the tortious conduct or is on the scene immediately after the
228
injury occurs.
Courts have generally been reluctant to allow claims of emotional
229
It is not uncommon
distress based on the injury or death of animals.
resulting from the negligent destruction of property and, more specifically, holding that "damages
for mental suffering or emotional distress may not be recovered for the negligently inflicted death
of an animal"), and Strawser v. Wright, 610 N.E.2d 610, 612 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992) (stating that
Ohio law does not permit recovery for emotional distress caused by the negligent injury or
destruction of property). One argument that has been raised to attempt to circumvent the
restrictions on recovering damages for the loss of personal property is the theory of "constitutive
property." See Lockett v. Hill, 51 P.3d 5, 7 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). Constitutive property is based
on the theory that "ownership or possession of certain personal property, like a pet, can become a
central aspect of the owner's sense of identity." /d.
226. See Carroll v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the level of
conduct necessary to support a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
veterinarian when a client's cat escaped while under the veterinarian's care); see also Katsaris v.
Cook, 225 Cal. Rptr. 531, 536--38 (Ct. App. 1986) (discussing the test of extreme and outrageous
conduct in a case in which two dogs were shot and remanding to deternune if post-shooting
conduct supported the claim); Harasymiv v. Veterinary Surgical Assocs., 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 9056, at * 10-* 11 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2003) (concluding that conduct by a
veterinarian sued for malpractice was not extreme, shocking or despicable and that "no
reasonable juror could find that defendants' conduct as alleged 'exceeded all bounds usually
tolerated by a decent society"' (citation omitted)). The Katsaris case had a strong dissenting
opinion interpreting the statute that provided immunity from the killing of animals harassing
livestock. Katsaris, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 534 n.2; id. at 538 (Sabraw, J., dissenting). "Not only is
[the dog] more than property today, he is the subject of sonnets, the object of song, the symbol of
loyalty. Indeed, he is man's best friend." Id. at 538 (Sabraw, J., dissenting).
227. See Langford v. Emergency Pet Clinic, 644 N.E.2d 1035, 1037 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994)
(providing that a plaintiff must be a bystander to an accident or be in fear of physical hann to
present a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress in a case relating to a dog's improper
burial); Rowbotham v. Maher, 658 A.2d 912, 913 (R.I. 1995) (finding that a third party may only
recover if he or she is a close relative of the victim and, because the victim was a dog, finding that
the dog was not considered a relative).
228. See Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286, 1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (applying the
general rules relating to emotional distress recovery and precluding any recovery for emotional
distress suffered by the owners of sheep that were allegedly killed by neighbors' dogs). The
Krasnecky court specifically found that it was not required to consider whether the class of
persons included within emotional distress coverage included companion animals. /d. at 128889.
229. Huss, Co1npanion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 93-97 (discussing emotional distress
claims relating to the loss of companion animals generally, regardless of the circumstance); see
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230
damages.

for courts to strike claims for such
There have been a few
cases where courts have allowed for the possibility of emotional distress
also Roman v. Carroll, 621 P.2d 307, 308 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that where a dog was
dismembered by another dog, "[d]amages are not recoverable for negligent infliction of emotional
distress from witnessing injury to property"); Coston v. Reardon, No. 63892, 2001 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 3188, at *9-*'11 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2001) (finding the requirement that one be
closely related to the injury victim in order to establish emotional distress would not be fulfilled
by the relationship to the animal and noting that Connecticut does not allow recovery for
negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from injury to property); Krasnecky, 777
N .E.2d at 1288-89 (utilizing existing temporal and spatial proximity requirements in
Massachusetts law to not allow claims of emotional distress for the death of seven sheep that the
plaintiffs considered companion animals and declining to consider the expansion of the class of
persons allowed to recover for emotional distress to companion animals); Rabideau v. Racine,
627 N.W.2d 795, 802, 806 (Wis. 2001) (holding that negligent damage to property cannot be used
to maintain a claim for emotional distress, though recognizing that the argument was made in
good faith for an extension of existing law and was not frivolous). In addition, there have been
several cases raising this issue in New York. New York courts have consistently found that New
York laws do not pernlit recovery for mental suffering and emotional distress in connection with
the loss of an animal. See Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, 844 F. Supp. 151, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(providing an example in a case in which a dog died, alleged1y due to the negligence of an
airline); Johnson v. Douglas, 734 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (App. Div. 2001) (affirming a dismissal of a
claim for emotional distress resulting front the loss of a pet by only stating "[i]t is well
established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress caused
by the negligent killing of a dog"); Jason v. Parks, 638 N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (App. Div. 1995) ("It is
well established that a pet owner in New York cannot recover damages for emotional distress
caused by the negligent destruction of a dog."); Young v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d
390, 391 (App. Div. 1980) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover for emotional distress for
loss of property).
Some confusion has arisen from a. finding. in an often cited and criticized New York case in
which an owner of a poodle who had made elaborate arrangements for the burial of her dog
instead found remains of a dead cat in the casket and succeeded on her claim. Corso v. Crawford
Dog & Cat Hosp., 415 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Civ. Ct. 1979) (finding plaintiff was entitled to
damages beyond the market value of the dog to compensate for "shock, mental anguish, and
despondency"). But see Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158 (criticizing the Corso case). The Corso
court found that losing the right to memorialize a pet dog (versus a pet rock or losing a family
photo album) would be actionable. Corso, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 183. The court distinguished
between inanimate objects and pets that return love and affection, respond to human stimulation,
and have brains capable of displaying emotion, causing a human response. /d. The court held
that "a pet. is not just a thing but occupies a special place somewhere in between a person and a
piece of personal property." /d. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to damages
beyond the market value of the dog from due to the "shock, mental anguish, and despondency"
caused by the wrongful destruction and loss of the dog's body. /d. Although sometimes this case
is cited to support claims of emotional distress, the New York coun treated the mental anguish
suffered by the plaintiff as merely a component of the damages from the wrongful destruction and
loss of the dog's body, not as a separate claim of emotional distress. ld.; see also Brown v.
Muhlenberg Township, 269 F.3d 205, 218-19 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing a distinction in
Pennsylvania law between claims of emotional distress based on behavior toward animals and
claims based on behavior that is focused on humans).
230. E.g., State v. Morison; 365 P.2d 266, 268 (Colo. 1961) (reporting that the trial court
struck a claim for damages in the amount of $25,000 based on the plaintiffs suffering "great
distress and anguish of mind, and loss of time and effort''); Harabes v. Barkery, Inc., 791 A. 2d
1142, 1143-46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2001) (setting forth arguments for and against allowing
emotional distress damages for the loss of pets in a negligence action against a groomer and
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damages in the event of injury or death to animals but have found that
231
The courts in these
the conduct at issue did not meet the standard.
cases generally have been able to find that existing state law supports
232
the recovery of emotional distress damages for the loss of property.

•

finding that allowing such damages would "proceed upon a course that had no just stopping
point").
231. A Kentucky court of appeals found that punitive damages for claims based on intentional
infliction of emotional distress would not be precluded simply because the underlying facts
involved an animal. Burgess v. Taylor, 44 S.W.3d 806, 812-13 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that
a case involving the sale of horses for slaughter supported a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress). The facts supporting this claim included repeated lying on the part of the
defendants as to the status of the horses. /d. at 810. In another case, the Verntont Supreme Court
indicated that a future case seeking recovery for emotional distress resulting from the negligent
handling of an impounded animal could be successful. Lamare v. N. Country Animal League,
743 A.2d 598, 605 (Vt. 1999) ("[T]his is not to say that a future case seeking recovery for the
emotional distress or other damages resulting from the negligent handling of an impounded
animal a claim not alleged here would be unsuccessful."). The !Amare case can be
distinguished from many of the other cases discussed in this section because no injury was
inflicted on the animal. /d. at 599-600. In La1nare, a dog was allowed to be adopted even though
an owner had been identified and had taken measures to reclaim the dog. /d. at 599--600.
North Dakota's Supreme Court has analyzed the conduct of police officers who shot and killed
five dogs in a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Kautzman v. McDonald, 621
N.W.2d 871, 876-77 (N.D. 2001). The Kautzman court found that the actions of the officers
were not within the parameters of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress but
reinstated the negligence claim based on the status of the animals. /d. at 877-80. Similarly, the
Alaska Supreme Court stated that it was "willing to recognize a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the intentional or reckless killing of a pet animal in an
appropriate case." Richardson v. Fairbanks N. Star Borough, 705 P.2d 454, 456 (Alaska 1985).
The Alaska Supreme Court reaffirnted its willingness to support a claim of emotional distress for
the loss of a pet in 2001. Mitchell v. Heinrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311-12 (Alaska 2001) (recognizing
a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress for the killing of a pet animal
but finding that the facts of the case did not support this claim). For an Idaho court decision
addressing claims of emotional distress stemming from animal loss, see Gill v. Brown, 695 P.2d
1276, 1277-78 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985) (finding that a lower court erred in striking the Gill's claim
for damages caused by mental anguish for the alleged killing of a pet donkey).
232. For examples of non-malpractice cases discussing emotional distress claims for the
injury or death of the animal, see Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station, 632 P.2d 1066, 1067
(Haw. 1981) (discussing the negligence of the Animal Quarantine Station where dogs were left in
a hot van for at least an hour causing one dog to die of heat prostration), and see also McAdams v.
Faulk, No. CAOI-1350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at *13-*14 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002)
(reversing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint against a veterinarian for negligence and
malpractice and stating that "damages on a negligence claim are not limited economic loss
damages, and inc1ude compensation for mental anguish"), and Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d
1225, 1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (providing that a dog owner's claim for mental pain and
suffering presented a question for the jury in a case where a veterinarian allegedly left a dog on a
heating pad for a long period of time resulting in serious bums to the animal). But see Koester v.
VCA Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (expressing sympathy for the
plaintiffs position regarding emotional distress but deferring to the legislature to create such a
remedy); Soto v. United States, No. 1:01-CV-117, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10743, *6-*8 (W.O.
Mich. July 23, 2001) (citing to the Koester case to find that Michigan does not allow for recovery
of emotional distress damages resulting from the loss of a pet). In Campbell, the damages for the
loss of the dog totaled $1000. Campbell, 632 P.2d at 1067. Hawaii had previously allowed
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As the claim of veterinary malpractice usually is based on a theory of
negligence, it is not surprising that it is difficult to find cases that have
facts supporting the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
case of Miller v. Peraino illustrates one court's view of the use of the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress in a case involving
233
The clients
the relationship between a client and a veterinarian.
234
brought their dog Nera to the veterinarian for oral surgery.
The
veterinarian told the clients that Nera had died of a heart attack but
employees of the veterinarian reported that Nera died after the
235
After the
veterinarian had kicked and beaten the dog with a pole.
for1ner employees and the clients began picketing the veterinary
hospital, the veterinarian sued all of them for defamation, intentional
interference with a business and contractual relationship, intentional
The clients
infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. 236
counterclaimed with allegations, among others, of the intentional
infliction of emotional distress resulting from the conduct that led to
237
Nera's death.
The Miller court distinguished between the
veterinarian's actions towards the dog and other conduct that would
238
support the claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Essentially, conduct that is directed toward the dog does not support a
239
cause of action.
The court found that recovery for conduct directed
toward third parties is limited to members of a person's immediate
family present at the time, or other persons if the distress results in
240
bodily harm.
The Miller court cited to Pennsylvania statutory
language stating that dogs are considered to be personal property and
241
cannot be considered persons or family members.

claims of emotional distress for the negligent or intentional infliction of damage to personal
property and did not require that the plaintiffs have actually witnessed the tortious event in order
to recover damages. /d. at 1069, 1071. Hawaii was the first jurisdiction to allow recovery for
mental distress without a showing of physically manifested hann. /d.
233. Miller v. Peraino, .626 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
234. Jd. at 638.
235. /d.
236. /d.
237. /d. at 639-40.
238. /d. at 640.
239. /d. The Miller court cited to an earlier Pennsylvania case alleging the intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising from the death of a dog, Da.ughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858,
864 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). The Miller case is discussed in greater length in this Article because
the Daughen court focused more on the viability of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress itself, rather than the possible facts that could support such a tort.
240. Miller, 626 A.2d at 640.
241. /d.
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Conversely, it might be possible to sustain a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress based on the v.e terinarian's conduct
242
toward clients.
As the Miller court stated, the defendant's conduct
243
must be extreme and outrageous:
It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with an intent
which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict
emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by
malice, or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to
punitive damages for another tort. Liability has been found only
where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, so extreme in
degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be
244
regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.
In the Miller case, the veterinarian allegedly made statements such as
"Nice truck, soon I'll own it" while writing down the truck's license
245
plate number, and that Nera was ''fat and ugly like Mrs. Peraino.'-'
The veterinarian also ''asked whether the Perainos had made a rug out
of Nera" and had "placed the Perainos' phone number on public phones
246
with the notation that a good time could be had by calling 'Flo. '"
The Miller court found that the lower court did not abuse its discretion
by finding that these statements did not meet the standard for a
247
successful claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
An illustration of the way courts consider claims based on the
negligent actions of a veterinarian is Robin v. Sammarco, in which a
Pennsylvania district court discussed and dismissed a claim of negligent
infliction of emotional distress in the case of a dog that died allegedly
248
due to negligent post-operative treatment~
In order to state a claim
for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Pennsylvania, it is
necessary to show that the plaintiff is a Hforeseeable plaintiff who
249
suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant's negligence.''
The element of foreseeability is satisfied if "( 1) the plaintiff is a
bystander who contemporaneously witnesses an accident in which a
close family member is injured, or (2) the defendant owes the plaintiff a
.

242.

243.
244.
245.
246.

.

/d.
/d. at 641.
/d.
/d.
/d.

247. Id~
248. Bobin v. Sammarco, No. 94-5115, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6671, at *4, *8 (E.D. Pa. May
17, 1995).
249. /d. at *5.
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250
care. "

pre-existing contractual or fiduciary duty of
In order to meet
this standard, the Bobins argued that the court
should ( 1) regard domesticated dogs as "'persons' for the limited
purposes of recognizing the intimate and familial relationship between
[a dog] and its owner"; (2) expand the definition of "family" to
include pets; and (3) recognize domesticated animals as a special
251
category of personal property entitled to special legal status.
252
The Bob in court declined to follow any of these theories.
The Bobin
court (like the Miller court) cited Pennsylvania statutory and case law
supporting the proposition that dogs are personal property and not
253
The court next found that there was no controlling authority
persons.
that would even suggest that Pennsylvania "would recognize the
relationship between [pets and their owners] as the functional equivalent
254
of an intimate familial relationship for this purpose."
Finally, the
court found that Pennsylvania does not regard pets as a unique form of
255
personal property.
Using this analysis, the district court predicted
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not recognize the cause of
action for negligent infliction of emotional distress resulting from the
256
death of a dog and dismissed that count of the pleading.
Courts in Connecticut have also considered the applicability of
257
emotional distress claims in a veterinary malpractice lawsuit.
The
court in George v. Leopold found that "bystander emotional distress
should not be recognized as a basis for recovery in veterinarian
malpractice."258 The George court considered the existing restrictions
on the bystander emotional distress action and found that the cause of
259
action would fail in several respects.
Initially the court found that the
relationship between the client and patient was not one of close
260
The court also stated "it is unlikely that a cat was
relation.
261
An earlier
contemplated in the court's contemplation of 'victim."'

250. /d. at *5-*6.
251. /d. at *6 (alteration in the original) (quoting plaintiffs' complaint).
252. /d. at *7-*8.
253. !d. at *7.
254. /d. The court found that relevant Pennsylvania case law supported the contrary
conclusion. /d.
255. /d. at *8.
256. /d.
257. See generally George v. Leopold, No. 314997, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2859 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 31, 1996); Altieri v. Nanavati, 573 A.2d 359 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989).
258. George, 1996 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2859, at *5.
259. /d. at *7-*8.
260. /d. at *4.
261. /d.
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Connecticut case also considered the applicability of bystander
262
emotional distress claims in the context of veterinary malpractice.
The court in Altieri v. Nanavati considered the likelihood that the claim
would be available given that the Connecticut Supreme Court had held
previously that there could be no bystander emotional distress claim
263
arising out of a case of medical malpractice on another person.
The
Altieri court stated that there "is no reason to believe that malpractice on
the family pet will receive higher protection than malpractice on a child
264
or spouse. "
2. Punitive Damages
•

Punitive damages are awarded to "punish or deter willful, wanton or
265
malicious misconduct";
they are imposed to punish defendants for
262. Altieri, 573 A.2d at 361.
263. /d.; cf Zeid v. Pearce, 953 S.W.2d 368, 369 (Tex. App. 1997). In Zeid, the court noted
"that the Texas Supreme Court has held that one may not recover damages for bystander recovery
for mental anguish in medical malpractice cases. . . . We see no reason why the same rule would
not apply in cases involving death due to veterinary malpractice." /d. at 370 (citations omitted).
264. Altieri, 573 A.2d at 361. Another example is a 1996 Iowa Supreme Court case in which
the court refused to allow the owners of a dog that was injured during the dog's stay at a boarding
kennel to recover damages for mental distress based on sentimental attachment to the dog or
damages for replacement cost or for the pet's special value. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555
N.W.2d 689, 690-92 (Iowa 1996). The injured dog was a toy poodle that had had her left front
leg and shoulder blade tom off by the kennel owner's dog. /d. at 690. Although the Iowa
Supreme Court recognized that there had been some cases in which damages for mental distress
had been allowed in actions based on the killing of a dog, the court found that Iowa law would
not support such a claim. /d. at 691. As with some other states, Iowa law required that a plaintiff
"must actually witness a tortious event in order to recover damages for emotional distress" and
that, furthermore, there must be a close relationship between the plaintiff and the victim. /d. The
law requires that "the plaintiff and victim [be] husband and wife or [be] related to within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity." /d. As much as a beloved pet may be considered a
member of the family, the court found that under the law, the animal would not fall within this
definition. /d. The court decided to follow the majority of jurisdictions that did not allow the
recovery of damages for this type of mental distress. /d. The Iowa Supreme Court also held that
the intrinsic value of the dog would not be considered in awarding damages for injuries to the
dog. /d. at 692. Not only did the court state that there was no evidence that the dog had a special
purpose, the court also noted that the Nichols still enjoyed the companionship of their pet (with
the market value of a three-legged dog and four-legged dog being the same). /d. at 690, 692. The
Iowa Supreme Court had previously recognized the intrinsic value of trees if the trees were
standing for a special purpose, such as sentimental and historic reasons, maintained for shade and
windbreaks, or for environmental, wildlife and special landmark purposes. /d. at 692. The court
cited to an Iowa code provision that allowed for treble damages for the willful injury of trees, the
lack of such a statute covering dogs, and the lack of evidence that the dog had a special purpose
or intrinsic value, and held that intrinsic value should not be used to measure damages in the case.
/d. at 692; cf Fredeen v. Stride, 525 P.2d 166, 168 (Or. 1974) (providing that conversion does not
ordinarily "cause the property owner sufficient mental anguish" for pain and suffering, but that
mental distress may be considered "as an element of the damages").
265. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.205(10) (West 2000) (defining punitive damages in medical
malpractice cases).
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wrongdoing that is considered extreme and to "deter others from
266
engaging in similar conduct."
Punitive damages have long been
267
available for the, malicious killing of another person's animal.
There
have been relatively few cases that illustrate the availability of punitive
268
damages in veterinary malpractice cases.
An example is the Carroll
269
v. Rock case, in which a client sued for the loss of her cat.
The
Carroll court articulated the test for recovery of vindictive or punitive
damages as "when a defendant acts .m aliciously, willfully, or with a
270
wanton disregard of the rights of others . "
Other cases have
established that punitive damages are supported where the conduct is
grossly negligent, malicious, willful or wanton, or there has been a

266. Peck, supra note 113, at 409-10 (discussing punitive damages in tort l+tw and stating that
punitive damages were "well-established as part of the common law well before the American
Revolution").
267. LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETII R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 666 (4th ed. 2000);
see also Mitchell v. Henrichs, 27 P.3d 309, 311 (Alaska 2001) (discussing the type of offensive
conduct that would support punitive damages); Wilson v. City of Eagan, 297 N.W.2d 146, 15051 (Minn. 1980) (finding that punitive damages were appropriate in, a case against an animal
warden who had intentionally killed a cat in violation of an ordinance and statute, although the
jury verdict of $2000 in punitive damages was reduced to $500); Molenaar v. United Cattle Co.,
553 N.W.2d 424, 426, 428-30 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (discussing the availability of punitive
damages in a personal property action in which sixty-five heifers were converted and punitive
damages in the amount of $400,000 were awarded by the jury); Propes v. Griffith, 25 S.W.3d
544, 547, 550-51 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (upholding an award of $2000 in actual damages and
$4000 in punitive damages for the euthanization of two dogs by a person who was untruthful
about her ownership of the dogs and committed other malicious, willful, and intentional conduct).
268. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 267, at 666 (citing to Aorida cases that have allowed
punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases); e.g., Johnson v. Wander, 592 So. 2d 1225,
1226 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that a dog owner may be able to support punitive
damages for emotional distress suffered as a result of a veterinarian's negligence); Knowles
Animal Hosp. v. Wills, 360 So. 2d 37, 38 (fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that an animal
hospital's neglect of a dog which resulted in injury was sufficient to support a judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs); see also McAdams v. Faulk, No. CAOl-1350, 2002 Ark. App. LEXIS 258, at
*13~*14 (Ark. Ct. App. Apr. 24, 2002) (reversing a trial court's dismissal of a complaint against
a veterinarian for negligence and malpractice and noting that "punitive damages are recoverable
on a malpractice claim").
269. Carroll v. Rock, 469 S.E.2d 391, 392 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996). This case was not one of
malpractice but was based on the theory of conversion or breach of bailment and emotional
distress. /d. The client took her two cats to a veterinary clinic for surgery, and one of the cats
escaped from the clinic. /d. at 392-93. The cat was never recovered. /d. at 392.
270. ld. at 393. The Carrol/ court found that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on
punitive and vindictive damages but stated that such instruction was uinconsequential because no
punitive damages were awarded." ld. The Carroll court continued and found that award of
damages for mental distress that does not accompany physical or pecuniary loss is allowed only if
the conduct met the same standard required for outrageous or egregious conduct. /d. at 393-94.
The court found that the conduct in the case did "not rise to the level of outrageousness and
egregiousness required to support recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress." /d. at
394.
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271
rights.

reckless disregard of an owner's
As with claims of intentional
infliction of emotional distress, if the core of the action is based on the
negligent actions of a veterinarian, it appears unlikely that the tortious
conduct would rise to the level necessary to support punitive
272
damages.
3. Loss of Companionship
An additional possible claim relating to the loss of an animal is loss
of companionship, which is similar to claims based on a human's loss of
273
consortium.
As loss of consortium claims have developed over the
years, so has the argument that a loss of companionship claim based on
274
the death of a companion animal may be viable.
Courts originally limited loss of consortium claims to the material
275
A more sentimental
services that a wife provided in the home.
concept later developed that considered a spouse's loss of affection and
276
Finally, parents' claims relating to the loss of a child
companionship.
were allowed, and several states have recognized a child's-claim for the
277
loss of parental consortium.
Surveys show that many companion animals are treated as if they are
278
Studies examinin_g the nature of the relationship
family members.
between humans and companion animals demonstrate that there is a

271. SCHLUETER & REDDEN; supra note 267, at 666; see also Knowles Ani!Ml Hosp., 360 So.
2d at 38 (affirming a jury award totaling $13,000 for the death of a dog that had been severely
burned because a veterinary hospital had left the dog on a heating pad for more than a day and
holding the injury "suffered by the dog to have been of a character amounting to great
indifference to the property of the plaintiffs").
272. See generally infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text (discussing possible limitations
and restrictions on punitive damages).
273. See infra notes 323-43 and accompanying text (discussing analogy to wrongful death
claims).
274. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 47.
275. /d.
276. /d. Some courts treat these material and sentimental aspects of consortium indivisibly.
/d.

277. /d. at 47, 50. The claim of loss of consortium was originally supported by the injury of a
spouse or parent, but there are wrongful death statutes that may allow recovery on the same
grounds. /d. at 48. Note that wrongful death claims are often restricted by state statute. One
example is the various Indiana code provisions covering wrongful death claims where thedecedent is not married and does not have dependent children, or where the decedent is a child.
Tammy J. Meyer&, Kyle A. Lansberry, Tort lAw: Recent Developments in Indiana Tort Law, 34

L. REV. 1075, 1075-80 (2001).
278. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (discussing the familial relationships,

IND.

between humans and their animal companions). Seventy percent of dog owners and sixty-two
percent of cat owners consider their companion animals to be like children or family members.
AM. PET PRODS. MFRS. ASS'N, supra note 5, at xxxiv (reporting data from 2002).
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sig_nificant impact on humans who share their lives with a companion
279
This is not an argument that companion animals should be
animal.
treated as if they are human children or siblings, only that some
companion animals take on roles similar to those of people. Certainly
the issue of proving the relationship is one that would need to be
addressed to determine whether damages for loss of companionship are
appropriate. Clearly, one can make a distinction between animals that
are treated as members of the family, in that they live in the home and
receive the best veterinary care- that can be provided, and animals that
280
have little contact with human family members.
A few cases have held that loss of companionship can be one factor
281
On the other hand,
in calculating the actual value of an animal.
several cases have held that separate claims for loss of companionship
282
would not be allowed for the loss of an animal.
279. See generally COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTH, supra note 2 (discussing a
variety of studies done on the impact of companion animals in human health}; MELSON, supra
note 3 (discussing the relationship between animals and children and the impact animal contact
has on children).
280. The same type of proof is necessary in any loss of consortium claim. See Elaine T.
Byszewski, Valuing Companion Animals in Wrongful Death Cases: A Survey of Current Court
and Legislative Action and a Suggestion for Valuing Pecuniary Loss of Companionship, 9
ANIMAL L~ 215 (2003) (discussing valuation of animals and suggesting an "investment approach"
to the valuation of animals); Susanne Cetrulo, A Practitioner's Analysis _of the Loss of Parental
Consortium in Kentucky, 26 N. KY. L. REv. I, 13 (1999) (discussing factors considered in
detennining the amount of damages for a loss of consortium claim by a child, including the
child's relationship with the parent); Geordie Duckier, The Economic Value of Companion
Animals~· A Legal and Anthropological Argum-e nt for Special Valuation, 8 ANIMAL L. 199 (2002)
(discussing the true economic value of animals and utilizing wrongful death case law criteria in
his analysis). ·
281. .Jankoski v. Preiser Animal Hosp., 510 N.E.2d 1084, 1087 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987) (affinning
that the loss of companionship could be used as an elen1ent in detennining damages in a property
damage case~ similar to the treatment of other items of sentimental value, such as heirlooms and
photographs, but refusing to extend an independent cause of action for loss of companionship).
282. ld. (declining to extend an independent cause of action for loss of companionship for the
death of a dog allegedly due to veterinary malpractice); Ammon v. Welty, 113 S.W.3d 185, 18788 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (declining to allow damages for loss of consortium and pointing to the
lack of a familial relationship in this case, in which a dog was destroyed by a dog warden prior to
the: expiration of a statutory seven-day waiting period); Krasnecky v. Meffen, 777 N.E.2d 1286,
1289 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002) (finding that the "absence of statutory authority precludes recovery
on the plaintiffs' loss of consortium claims related to the death of the sheep" where seven sheep
that were considered companion animals were allegedly killed by the defendants' dogs);
Oberschlake v. Ve.t erinary Assocs. Animal Hosp., 785 N.E.2d 811 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003) (stating
that Ohio does not recognize non-economic damages for injuries to companion animals in a
veterinary malpractice case); see also Gluckman v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 151, 158
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (dismissing a loss of companionship claim and distinguishing Brousseau v.
Rosenthal, 443 N.Y.S.2d 285 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1980), which had allowed a pefs
companionship to be used as a factor .to assess a dog's actual value to an owner); Koester v. VCA
Animal Hosp., 624 N.W.2d 209, 211 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (declining to create an independent
cause of action for loss of companionship); Daughen v. Fox, 539 A.2d 858, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct.
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C. Statutory Provisions

Recently there have been proposals for several statutory provisions
that would establish a right to sue for damages, including non-economic
283
damages, for the death or injury of animals.
Such statutes generally
284
focus on domesticated companion animals.
Proposals for these
statutes commonly occur after cases involving the intentional killing of
285
companion animals receive significant attention.
However, a
Tennessee statute, the first of its kind, specifically states that it does not
apply to veterinarians in actions for professional negligence. 286 But
even if there is not a specific exclusion for veterinary malpractice
claims, the language of the statute may preclude its use in such claims,
as it is common that for the statutory provision to be applicable, the
animal must be within the direct control or supervision of its owner or
2
7
on the owner's premises. 8
•

1988) (stating that "[u]nder no circumstances, under the law of Pennsylvania, may there be
recovery for loss of companionship due to the death of an animal"). The Gluckman court also
dismissed a cause of action for an animal's pain and suffering. Gluckman, 844 F. Supp. at 158
(citing acknowledgment by Gluckman that "there is not a [sic] yet a cause of action recognized
for the pain and suffering of an animal"). Note that a circuit court judge in Oregon recently ruled
against a motion to dismiss all causes of action, including a claim for loss of companionship of an
animal. Geordie L. Duckier & Dana M. Campbell, Nature of the Beast: Is Animal Law Nipping
at Your Heels?, OR. ST. B. BULL., June 2001, at 15, 17 (discussing Brock v. Rowe, No.
C002535CV (Wash. County Ct.), a case that eventually settled).
283. Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing existing and
proposed statutes relating to the injury or death of companion animals); see also 510 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 70/16.3 (West Supp. 2003) (providing for damages in civil actions against persons
who have acted in bad faith in seizing or impounding animals or have been convicted of certain
felony animal welfare provisions); H.R. 1260, 64th Gen. Assem., 7th Sess . . (Colo. 2003)
(proposing loss of companionship damages not to exceed $100,000 for harm resulting from
cruelty to companion dogs and cats or from negligent veterinary practices).
284. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (covering "domesticated dogs and cats nonnally
maintained in or near the household of the owner"); see also Huss, Companion Animal Status,
supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing the Tennessee act and other proposed statutes).
285. E.g., N.Y. State Assembly, Bill Summary A04545 (n.d.) (providing a justification
based on "two recently-publicized cases" for a proposed law that would allow recovery of noneconomic damages in the death or injury of a companion animal), available at
http://www.assembly.state.ny.usneg/?bn=A04545 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
286. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403(e).
287. See, e.g., A04545, 2003-2004 Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003) (amending the agricultural
and markets law), available at http://www.assembly.state.ny.usneg/?bn=A04545&sh=t (last
visited Feb. 25, 2004).
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V.
PROPOSED CHANGES TO DAMAGES AVAILABLE IN VETERINARY
•
MALPRACTICE CASES

A. Should Non-economic Damages Be Available in Claims for the
Injury or Loss of Companion Animals?
An initial question is whether there should be a change from the
current system that, with very few exceptions, does not provide noneconomic damages for the injury or death of an animal.
Unquestionably, animals under the legal system are treated as just
another form of personal property. Whether this is appropriate depends
on one's view of the role of animals in today's society. It appears
unlikely that there will be a sweeping change in the legal system in the
near future to ensure that animals are no longer treated as personal
288
property.
The relationship between companion animals and the people who
289
care for them has changed and continues to develop.
There is now
evidence that companion animals can have a significant positive impact
290
on human health.
There is a greater acknowledgment of the role that
291
these animals play in the lives of their human family members.
From
another perspective, the value of these animals has changed. The
financial investment in these animals can be considerable for many
292
people.
There is a greater interest in the welfare and protection of

288. Perhaps an exception to this rule can be found in the treatment of great apes. There is an
active coalition of organizations attempting to provide additional protection to the great apeschimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans. One step in this process is providing that these
animals have a special and unique status. Ways to accomplish this include considering them as
beings and allocating rights to them. New Zealand has already taken this step. New Zealand's
1999 Animal Welfare Act provides that non-human great apes will have individual fundamental
rights. Animal Welfare Act, 1999 (N.Z.), available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz (last visited
Feb. 25, 2004); see also Germany Enshrines Rights of Animals, TORONTO STAR, May 18, 2002,
at A28 (discussing the New Zealand statute and noting that the rights include the right not to
suffer cruel or degrading treatment and to participate only in the most benign experiments),
available at 2002 WL 21219957.
289. See Huss, Companion Animal Issues, supra note 7, at 188-95 (discussing the
domestication of animals and the changing relationship between animals and humans).
290. See generally COMPANION ANIMALS IN HUMAN HEALTI-1, supra note 2 (discussing
studies that have been done on the impact .o f companion animals on human health).
;291. See MELSON, supra note 3, at 37-43 (discussing the impact pets have_on children and
families).
292. Obviously the amount of money that some are willing and able to invest in these animals
differs greatly. One animal may be given treatment for cancer, a kidney transplant, or multiple
surgeries to repair damage to its knees while other animals are only given palliative treatment or
are surrendered when the cost of their maintenance is considered too high. See Brody, supra note
19 (discussing medical treatments available to companion animals); Draper, supra note 13
(discussing laser surgery for animals).
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293
animals.

these
The law should reflect the values of society. Clearly,
for a considerable portion of the population, these animals have a
greater economic value than that reflected by currently available
294
damages.
The relationship between many people, and their animals is important
and should be protected.295 The tort law goals of affirtning societal
values through compensation are not being met under the current
system. 296 This matter is important to many people and the law, often
deals with the issues that impact the quality of life for individuals.
Several organizations have developed curricula with the goals of
fostering respect for all living things and improving the treatment of
297
animals at their core.
Allowing non-economic damages for the loss
of animals supports an argument that the value of all living creatures,
298
including human beings, is increased.
Recent studies link the abuse
299
of animals with other violent acts.
Providing more serious penalties
for tortious acts against animals may allow for the recognition of an
300
individual's potential for additional violence against humans.
Advocates of non-economic damages state that allowing such
damages would force veterinarians to be more conscientious and raise
301
the quality of veterinary care.
The economic impact of permitting
293. Eric Sundquist, Nonhuman Rights: Are Animals Ours To Eat, To Wear, To Experiment
On?, ATLANTA J. & C.O NST., Aug. 25, 2002, at QI (discussing state protections for animals and

stating that four laws making cruelty to animals a felony passed within the last year alone).
294. One insurance brokerage company, ABD Insurance and Financial Services, is w.orking to
educate its veterinarian clients about the impact of malpractice claims and the possibility of noneconomic damages becoming available. O'Brien, supra note 66~ Mr. O'Brien believes ihat it is
just a matter of time before non-economic damages (in some forrit) will be available to plaintiffs
in California. /d.
295. Kathleen Burge, Appeals Court Weighs the Value of Family Pets, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
25, 2001, at B l (citing to Barbara Newell, an attorney with the Animal Legal Defense Fund, who
stated that people have "real and familial relationships" with animals), available at 2001 WL
396354.
296. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 43 44 (setting forth the goals of the tort system and the.
arguments made by proponents for allowing economic damages for emotional harm suffered by
pet owners). "Owners' mental harm when a pet is wrongfully killed or injured is quite real, and
failure to compensate allows unchecked and uncompensated wrongs." ld. at 47.
297. MELSON, supra note 3, at 179-80; see also Lydia S. Antoncic, A New Era in Humane
Education: How Troubling Youth Trends and a Call for Character Education Are Breathing New
Life into Efforts To Educate Our Youth About the Value of AU Life, 9 ANIMAL L. 183 (2003)

(discussing humane education and state laws supporting humane education).
298. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 47-49.
299. MELSON, supra note 3, at 167-81.
300. /d. at 177-79 (discussing cross training and other activities related to the link between
animal and child abuse).
301. Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Robert Newman, an attorney who handles animal law
cases, including lawsuits against veterinarians for malpractice).
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non-economic damages supports the tort goal of deterring future bad
acts. In theory, allowing greater damage awards will force veterinarians
who do not meet the standard of care out of practice.
There is also a question of fairness. Veterinarians emphasize the
importance of the human-animal bond and should not be able to then
argue that the bond is irrelevant when it is time to determine damages in
302
Clients who are not bonded with their
malpractice actions.
companion animals would certainly not seek the sophisticated and
expensive treatments at the core of a growing number of veterinarian
specialists' practices. As a result, a natural consequence of veterinary
malpractice is emotional harm to the clients.
Opponents of non-economic damages often begin by highlighting the
economic impact such lawsuits would have on veterinarians and clients.
They argue that allowing these types of damages would cause
veterinarians to change their practices and to begin performing more
303
The cost of veterinary care will increase
defensive medicine.
304
Veterinarians
because veterinarians will order more expensive tests.
paying higher malpractice premiums will pass on that cost to their
305
The higher cost of veterinary care could price this treatment
clients.
beyond some people's ability to pay and may increase the rate of
306
euthanization of animals.
The financial impact on veterinarians'
practices could be significant, further eroding the relatively low salaries
307
of these medical professionals.
This financial pressure could cause
veterinarians to leave the practice and could decrease interest in this
308
field.
302. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 70 (citing to a veterinary ethics text discussing the
promotion of the human-companion bond).
303. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine
University).
304. /d.
305. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48; Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Victor Schwartz,
counsel for the American Tort Refonn Association, who said that allowing these types of
damages "encourages unnecessary lawsuits," and to Arthur Tennyson, an officer of the American
Veterinary Medical Association, who said that "such suits will drive up the cost of vets'
malpractice insurance"); see also O'Brien, supra note 66 (discussing the impact of higher awards
on the cost of veterinary care).
306. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine
University); see supra notes 110--14 and accompanying text (discussing some the arguments
made by proponents of limitations on medical malpractice damages).
307. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the average salary for
veterinarians compared to other medical professionals).
308. By analogy, consider the physicians who have ceased providing certain services because
of the risk of significant judgments against them on malpractice grounds. See generally Stein,
supra note 108 (discussing the impact of malpractice rates, including the closing of medical
clinics and the elimination of high-risk procedures and practices).
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Even if the economic benefits outweigh the costs, opponents of noneconomic damages point to philosophical arguments against equating
animals to humans in this manner. 309 One philosophical argument is
that allowing non-economic damages for the loss of animals will
corrode the traditional view that human life is sacred and more valuable
than animallife. 310 Wrongful death statutes articulate a restricted class
311
of human beneficiaries.
Allowing non-economic damages for the
loss of animals, makes it possible to argue that animals are being placed
above humans who are not covered by such statutes, such as committed
but unmarried partners or unadapted stepchildren.
A practical issue to consider is the recent trend to limit non-economic
damages. Non-economic damages are notoriously difficult to measure.
What is significant pain and suffering that adversely impacts the quality
312
of life for one person may not have the same effect on another.
There are .strong arguments on both sides of this issue. It is certainly
possible that a statutory provision allowing for non-economic damages
313
could cause insurance rates and veterinary costs to increase.
Uncertainty alone, especially in jurisdictions where there have been
higher than expected judgments or settlements, could also lead to
increased rates. An important public policy is to provide an atmosphere
where veterinarians can provide services at reasonable prices to as large
a number of animals as possible while supporting the general tort goals
309. Burge, supra note 295 (citing to Richard Cupp, a law professor at Pepperdine University,
who opposes awarding emotional damages to pet owners, stating that "[h)umans and animals are
not the same ... and should not be treated the same by the law"). Professor Cupp set out both
pragmatic and moral arguments against allowing emotional distress damages in a commentary
published in 1998. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Barking Up the Wrong Tree Justice: Awarding
Emotional Distress Damages to Pet Owners Whose Animals Are Harmed Is a Dog of an Idea,
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1998, at B5, available at 1998 WL 24395236.
310. Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48.
311. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL. , PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 947 (5th ed. 1984).
312. Note that this Article is not arguing that non-economic damages should be allocated for
the pain and suffering of the animals themselves. Although scientific studies have shown that
many species of animals have the capacity to feel pain in what appear to be ways similar to
humans, the focus in this Article is the impact of veterinarian malpractice on clients. There is
certainly room within the legal system to argue for allocation of damages for pain and suffering
of animals (presumably with any damage award to be used for the care of an animal). See Huss,
Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 101-02 (describing a proposed statute in
Massachusetts that would provide for such pain and suffering damages). One animal rights
activist argues that these pet cases are "worse than useless" because they reinforce the idea that
"non-human animals exist for humans' benefit" and are about "humano-centric interests."
Willing, supra note 17 (citing to Gary Francione, a Rutgers University law professor and author
of several animal rights books that focus on animals' status as property).
313. The cost of veterinary care has already increased with the utilization of specialists and
lifestyle drugs. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text (discussing the increasing number
of specialists and the types of veterinary treatment now available).
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of compensation, deterrence, and affirtnance of societal values.
Capping non-economic damages to a "reasonable" level would appear
to limit the impact of such damages on insurance rates and the provision
of veterinary services while allowing meritorious lawsuits.
If such a change is going to be made, for what losses should noneconomic damages be available? Non-economic damages in medical
malpractice cases are available to plaintiffs for pain, suffering,
inconvenience, mental distress, physical impainnent, disfigurement,
loss of capacity to enjoy life, loss of consortium, society and
companionship, loss of love or affection, and other nonpecuniary
315
damages.
Similar damages could be applied to veterinary
malpractice cases that impact clients.
Another issue is whether malpractice relating to all species of animals
should be covered. Historically, certain animals have been treated
316
The value of food producing animals appears to be
differently.
adequately measured under the current system. These animals have
always had economic value and such value usually can be determined
through market forces. Unlike companion animals, the treatment of
these animals does not cause great concern among the majority of the
317
The availability of non-economic damages is premised
population.
314. See generally Cupp & Dean, supra note 72, at 48 (discussing the elastic demand for

veterinary medicine). One response to the increasing cost of veterinary treatment is to allow for
the provision of basic treatment by animal care and nonprofit humane societies. Often there are
limitations on the care that these organizations can provide; however, Washington State recently
passed statutory provisions, effective on July 1, 2003, that would allow these types of
organizations to. provide electronic identification (microchipping), surgical sterilization, and
vaccinations to low income households. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 18.92.260 (West Supp.
2004). Sometimes services provided to low income animal owners are primarily intended to
accomplish a public health or safely goal, such as the vaccination of animals to prevent rabies and
the spaying or neutering of pets to deal with an overpopulation problem. See Claudia
Kawczynska, Taking It to the Streets, BARK, Fall 2001, at 30 (describing a mobile veterinary
clinic used in Los Angeles to provide spaying or neutering services to low income residents'
pets).
315. CAL. CIV. CODE§ 3333.2 (West 1997) (discussing California's cap of $250,000 on noneconomic losses for medical malpractice cases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2003)
(providing for a cap of $300,000 for non-economic damages in tort cases against health care
professionals); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.205(7) (West 2000) (defining non-economic damages);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-14.-11 (2002) (providing for limited liability of insureds under the
state's medical malpractice insurance scheme of $500,000 per claim and $1 million per policy
period); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-3-11 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 2003) (providing for a cap on
general damages of $500,000 with no limitation on special damages in medical malpractice
cases); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 893.55(4)(a) (West 1997) (defining non-economic damages).
316. See Huss~ Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 84-88 (discussing existing
distinctions based on an animal's species).
317. If so, presumably there would be a significantly greater percentage of vegetarians in the
population and more attention would be paid to factory farming. See generally MATfHEW
SCULLY, DOMINION: THE POWER OF MAN, THE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS, AND THE CALL TO
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on the type. of relationship that a person has with an animal.
Presumably, most people involved in food production would not have
this type of relationship with their food producing animals (although
certainly they may feel very differently about their co·m panion animals).
Making distinctions based on animal species is quite common under
current law, and there is no reason that such differences, based on the
use and usual relationship people have· with their animals, cannot be
318
continued under any new statutory provision.
Should general statutes relating to the death or injury of animals
include veterinarians? There, are compelling arguments. on both sides of
this issue. Those in favor of including veterinarians in a general statute
argue that, especially in egregious cases, veterinarians should not
receive protection from liability simply because of their profession. In
fact, an argument can be made that veterinarians should be held to a
higher standard of care because of the privilege the state grants them, in
the form of a license to provide veterinary medical treatment for a fee.
In addition, by bringing their companion animals to a veterinarian for
treatment, clients have formed a relationship of trust with their
veterinarian. The tort goal of deterrence of future bad acts applies
equally to veterinarians and other wrongdoers.
Opponents of including veterinarians in general statutes argue that
veterinarians are already regulated under veterinary practice acts and by
boards of veterinary medicine. One of the reasons for the general
statutes is to provide a civil remedy against wrongdoers for the
mistreatment of their animals. But, they argue, the common law has
already provided such a remedy that of veterinary malpractice. In
addition, there will likely be more suits against veterinarians than other
wrongdoers simply because veterinarians are identifiable, unlike many
319
perpetrators of violence against animals.
Finally, from a rational
political perspective, unless there are additional safeguards for
veterinarians in a statute with general coverage, including veterinarians
will likely create a considerable amount of opposition to such
legislation. The best statutory language is irrelevant if the legislature
cannot pass it. A separate provision relating to damages for veterinary

MERCY (2002) (discussing, among other matters, factory farming); Pollan, supra note 1, at 58

(discussing the industrialization of American animal farming and one response to it).
318. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 84-88 (discussing distinctions
among.animals).
319. See, e:g., N.Y. State Assembly, Bill Summary A04545, supra note 285 (citing to two
cases justifying the need for legislation and stating that neither perpetrator had been found).
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malpractice would logically be included in the statutory sections
32
relating to litigation actions. 0
For these reasons, I recommend the adoption of a separate act relating
to veterinary malpractice. Certainly, there should be other acts that
relate to the injury or death of companion animals caused by nonveterinarians, as many of the same justifications for adequate remedies
321
The distinction is that veterinarians,
apply in those situations.
because of the importance of their role in providing health care to
animals, should be afforded protections that are not warranted if a non322
veterinarian causes injury to or death of a companion animal.

B. Analogy to Wrongful Death Statutes and the Impact of Tort Reform
The focus of this paper has been on the underlying action veterinary
malpractice as the basis for suit. Because animals do not have standing
to sue on their own behalf, it is necessary to allow their legal owners to
323
This Article does not attempt to argue that animals should be
sue.
able to sue on their own behalves rather, the goal of this Article is to
show that the persons closest to the animal should have the right to sue
324
based on the veterinary malpractice's impact on their lives.
It is this
impact on third parties that is analogous to existing wrongful death
statutes. There are very few cases in which an animal is injured but
recovers from its injuries, and the damages issues are complicated in
325
such situations.
Presumably, many of the damages would be the
320. For example, under the current law of South Dakota, there is a specific provision
providing for a three-year statute of limitations for actions against veterinarians for "malpractice,
error, mistake, or failure to cure." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 15-2-14.5 (Michie 2001). The section
does not prohibit any counterclaim as a defense to any action for services brought by a
veterinarian. /d.
321. See Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 98-103 (discussing current and
proposed statutes that apply to non-veterinarian wrongdoers).
322. Although other providers of services for companion animals, such as groomers and
boarders, would also experience the impact of allowing non-economic damages, a general statute
could cover these providers.
323. Huss, Companion Animal Status, supra note 1, at 79-82 (discussing the issue of standing
as it relates to animals).
324. This does not mean that there are no strong arguments that a suit should not be allowed
for the impact of the veterinary malpractice on the animals themselves. There are scientific
studies supporting the ability of many animals (specifically mammals) to experience pain. There
are commentators who argue that focusing the impact on humans reinforces the property status of
animals. See GARY L. FRANCIONE, ANIMALS, PROPERTY AND THE LAW (ETHICS AND ACTION)
( 1995).
325. An example of this situation is an Iowa Supreme Court case that found that when a dog
was injured but not killed, the market value of a three-legged dog and a four-legged dog was the
same. Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels, 555 N.W.2d 689, 690, 692 (Iowa 1996). The injured dog was
a toy poodle that had had her left front leg and shoulder blade tom off by a kennel owner's dog.
/d. at 690.
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same if an animal survives, but from a practical perspective, many
326
veterinary malpractice suits arise because an animal has died.
The right of survivors to bring suit for compensation for the death of
327
a loved one is established by state statute in the United States.
328
Wrongful death statutes vary considerably by state.
The statutes
329
define the persons that may bring suit over the death.
Historically,
only spouses, parents, and children had the right to sue under a
330
wrongful death statute.
Other possible claimants include siblings.
Obviously the relationships between veterinary clients and their animals
331
do not fit within any of these categories, except by analogy.
Wrongful death statutes may create a new cause of action or merely
332
create a remedy to support an existing cause of action.
One example
of this is the interaction between medical malpractice claims and
wrongful death statutes. In some states, the interaction between
statutory provisions dealing with medical malpractice and wrongful
death statutes is clear, but in others, there is still some confusion over
333
the rights of parties because of contradictions in the two statutes.
326. WILSON, supra note 14, at 119 (citing to sources at the California State Veterinary Board
stating that "approximately 50-70% of all grievances are associated with the death of an animal").
The complication, of course, is that unlike medical care for humans, euthanasia is a common and
accepted part of veterinary practice. The euthanasia of animals occurs both because of economic
reasons and a desire to put animals out of their pain. See generally Sara A. Wiswall, Animal
Euthanasia and Duties Owed to Animals, 30 MCGEORGE L. REv. 801 (1999) (describing new
California legislation regulating euthanasia). Note that California has a policy against the
euthanization of adoptable animals. See CAL. ClV. CODE§ 1834.4 (West Supp. 2004).
327. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH OR INJURY § 1:9 (3d
ed. 1992). Speiser sets out the historical background of wrongful death statutes. /d. § 1:8.
328. /d. § 1.9 ("The provisions of the different American state death statutes vary widely.");
see also id. § 1.13 (providing that "each of the 50 states has some statutory system under which
damages may be awarded for wrongful death").
329. . KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 947.
330. /d. The ability of a person to sue for the death of an unborn fetus varies by state. Many
times recovery is based on whether the fetus is viable at the time of the incident that caused the
tennination of the pregnancy. Jill D. Washburn Helbring, To Recover or Not To Recover: A State
by State Survey of Fetal Wrongful Death Law, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 363 (1996) (discussing the
ability to recover for the death of a fetus and dividing the analysis into various time periods
relating to the status of the fetus).
331. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text (explaining that animals are often viewed as
members of the family). There have been plaintiffs who have unsuccessfully argued that their
companion animals should be treated as family members. See, e.g., Nichols v. Sukaro Kennels,
555 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Iowa 1996) (finding that as much as a beloved pet may be considered a
member of the family, under Iowa law, the animal would not fall within the definition requiring
that the plaintiff and victim be related to within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity).
332. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, §§ 1: 13-1 : 14.
333. For example, a wrongful death statute may have a different statute of limitations than that
of a medical malpractice statute. Jared R. Faerber, Recent Developments in Utah La~v, 1997
UTAH L. REv. 1087, 1164 (stating that there are two competing standards in the United States
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In addition to wrongful death statutes of general application, there are
many state statutes that provide a remedy in the event of a death or
334
injury in specific circumstances.
The treatment of a specific
profession or activity in a special manner for tort liability is not
uncommon. Several recent tort reforms have had limited applicability,
335
allowing legislatures to pass them.
The damages available under wrongful death statutes have evolved
336
over time.
The type of damage that is most analogous to the changes
proposed in this Article is the ability to recover for the loss of
companionship. Early interpretation of many statutes did not allow for
337
the recovery of loss of companionship.
Just as wrongful death
statutes evolved to allow this type of damage, statutory provisions can
be enacted to encompass the relationship between humans and their
animal companions.
One barrier to changing the current system is the simple fact that such
338
Though
a statutory provision will be seen as a type of tort reforn1.
339
ideally, tort refortn should try
there are several goals of tort reform,
to discourage the filing of frivolous claims while supporting valid
.

.

governing which statute of limitations will control wrongful death actions arising from medical
malpractice claims).
334. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, § 1:9. There are also federal statutes that cover
wrongful death in specific situations. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 945-46.
335. Terry Carter, Piecemeal Tort Reform, A.B.A. J., Dec. 2001, at 50 (discussing incremeQtal
tort reform measures passed by the U.S. Congress and the likelihood of additional tort reform
targets); Andrew Harris, Federal Vaccine Act Shoots Down Suit, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 12, 2002, at
B 1 (discussing a recent case interpreting the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1992, 42
U.S.C. § 300, that allows for automatic recovery for damages but requires plaintiffs to fulfill
certain procedural requirements); John G. Salmon, Fifteen Years of Colorado Legislative Tort
Reform: Where Are We Now?, COLO. LAW., Feb. 2001, at 5, 7-10 (discussing statutory
provisions covering the tort liabiJity of special interests, such as dramshops, social hosts, firearms
and ammunition manufacturers, ski areas, equine and llama activity sponsors, and baseball team
owners).
336. 1 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 327, § 3:3.
337. /d. § 3:36. Speiser points out that the distinction between loss of companionship
damages and mental anguish damages is Ha fine one." /d.
338. One difficulty will be to pa~s a statute that will withstand judicial scrutiny. See generally
Bonanti, supra note 75 (viewing tort refonn as an effort to curb civil justice); William Glaberson,
State Courts Sweeping Away Laws Curbing Suits for Injury, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1999, at AI
(discussing the trend of judicial nullification of new liability laws), available at LEXIS, News
Library, New York Times File; Stephen Labaton, Added Rush on Revising Tort System, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2001, at Cl (discussing federal legislation that in specific instances would cap
attorneys fees and eliminate punitive damages), available at LEXIS, News Library, New York
Times File; James D. Zirin, Roadblocks to Tort Reform Global Economy, FORBES, Jan. ll, 1999,
at 80 (discussing tort reforms and state court nullification of many of the refonns), available at
1999 WL 2046167.
339. Scoggins, supra note 95, at 98.5-86.
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340
litigation.

The goal should not be eliminating the ability to file
claims against veterinarians. The judicial system can be a powerful
force for change. If a veterinarian consistently practices below the
standards set by the profession, the veterinarian should be encouraged,
through the imposition of damage awards against him or her, to leave
the profession. It is unlikely that every individual involved in such a
system, whether a veterinarian or a client, will be happy with the
system, but the goal should be that, as a whole, the system works best
for th·e public at large.
The difference in types of tort reform reveals that legislatures create
341
Although the
rights at the same time they cap potential damages.
right to sue for veterinary malpractice exists, the extension of damages
to encompass non-economic, damages would create a new remedy in
342
most jurisdictions.
Based on the adoption and subsequent judicial
treatment of other legislation, it appears that courts are likely to uphold
the validity of any new veterinary malpractice scheme because of its
343
limited scope.
C. Proposed Changes in Damages Available in Veterinary
Malpractice Cases

1. Capped Non-economic Damages
In most jurisdictions, statutory provisions must be passed in order to
provide, for non-economic damages in veterinary malpractice. Similar
to the statutory language in existing wrongful death statutes, the
proposed provision should set out the parameters for damages and the
344
beneficiaries of the statute.
The core language for such a statutory
345
provisio,n is set out in the Appendix to this Article.
Any new
statutory provision could encompass both economic and non-economic
340. /d. at 985.
341. This is especially clear in states, such as New York, with patterns of case law that have
already established that non-economic damages are not available in situations where property has
been destroyed., See s~Jpra note 229 and accompanying text (discussing cases where the courts
did not allow non-economic damages for injuries to animals as the animals were considered
property). Given the limited scope of this type of tort refonn, it may be more likely to withstand
judicial scrutiny. See generally Carter, supra note 335 (discussing incremental tort reform
measures passed by the U.S. Congress and the likelihood of additional tort reform targets).
342. See supra notes 223-64 and accompanying text (discussing the ability to recover
damages for emotional distress); supra notes 273-87 and accompanying text (discussing claims
of loss of companionship relating to the injury or death of an animal).
343. See generally DOBBS, supra note Ill, at 527.
344. KEETON ET AL., supra note 311, at 949-54 (discussing the types of damages provided for
under wrongful death statutes).
345. See infra app.
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damages or could limit itself to establishing_the ability to recover non346
economic damages alone.
Economic damages could expand from
347
merely the loss of the animal itself
to the recovery of veterinary
348
349
fees,
burial costs, court costs, and attorneys fees.
Allowable noneconomic damages could include the loss of reasonably exp_e cted
50
society, companionship, and love and affection of an animaJ.3
It
would also be appropriate for legislatures to clarify the circumstances, if
any, in which emotional distress claims could be brought relating· to the
injury or de_a th of an animal.
In line with the general trend in tort reform, any non-economic
351
damages allowed by statute should be subject to a cap.
A cap of
$25,000 on non-economic damages for the death of an animal is a
352
reasonable goai.
In some jurisdictions, proponents of legislation may
need to alter the level of the cap to ensure the passage of the legislation.
It is important to note that a cap serves as the outside limit of noneconomic damages. 'T here may be relatively few cases in which noneconomic damages in any significant amount will even arise, given a
particular community's attitude regarding the status of animals. It will
be important to maintain a cap of a certain level in order to provide an
353
incentive to bring only meritorious claims.

346. Id. (discussing the inclusion of .e conomic damages in wrongful death statutes and the
trend toward allowing loss of consortium damages).
,.
347. See generally supra notes 199-218 and accompanying text (discussing the valuation of
killed or injured animals in malpractice cases).
348. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (discussing a Maryland statute that allows for
lhe recovery of veterinary costs of up to $5000 for the tortious injury or death of a pet).,
349. Waisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 72 (setting forth a proposal for recovery of
damages in the case of the death or injury of companion animals caused by a tortious act
regardless of the circumstances).
350. TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (setting forth damages allowed by statute for the
tortious killing of pets).
351. Cf ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.0 I 0 (2002) (providing non-economic damages caps for
personal injury and wrongf"tl death actions)~ The Alaska statutory provision uses a multiple of a
person's life expectancy to detennine damages. ld. But see ARIZ. CONST. art. ll, § 31 (providing
that there shall be no limitations on ''the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death
or injury of any person"); id. art. XVIII, § 6 (providing that the ''right of action to recover
damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recovered shall not be subject to
any statutory limitation").
352. Cf H.R. 03-1260, 64th Gen. Assem. (Colo. 2003) (proposing that damages for loss of
companionship arising out of the death of animals from negligent veterinary practices be capped
at $100,000). Compare this with the $250,000 limitation on non-economic loss or injury
damages for the death of a human by negligence. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21..:203 (2003).
353~ In addition, to reflect the changing economy, the legislature should increase any cap to
reflect annual percentage changes in the _c onsumer price index. Cf. MICH~ COMP~ LAWS ANN.
§ 600.1483(4) (West 1996) (providing an annual increase in the limitation of non-economic
damages for medical malpractice cases); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 538.210 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004)
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If there is concern that a veterinarian liable for non-economic losses
may suffer an unreasonable financial burden, one way to alleviate the
problem is to provide that any damages for non-economic losses be
354
payable over a period of time, at the veterinarian's option.
The time
can be set by statute, or such a statutory provision could provide a range
of time depending on the value of the non-economic damages. The
legislature would determine the public policy issue of whether such a
time period would be necessary if the award is covered by insurance.
2. Limited Punitive Damages
It may be necessary to limit punitive damages or collapse noneconomic and punitive damages to,g ether in order to enable the passage
of statutory provisions for punitive damages. Punitive damages have
come under criticism in recent years along with other non-economic
355
Although statistically punitive damages are assessed on a
damages.
(setting a cap on non-economic damages at $350,000 per occurrence from any one defendant,
with adjustments based on personal consumption expenditures); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44:-2825
(1998 &_Supp. 2003) (setting the total amount recoverable under the Nebraska Hospital-Medical
Liability Act {optional for patients) to $1.25 million with health-care providers liable for no more
than $200,000); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 41A.031 (Michie Supp. 2003) (limiting non-economic
damages in medical malpractice cases to $350,000 for each defendant with some exceptions, such
as gross malpractice); WIS. STAT. ANN~- § 893.55(4)(d) (West 1997) (setting a cap of $350,000
for non-economic damage.s, as adjusted to reflect change.s in the consumer price index).
354. Cf. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-203 (2003) (providing that future damages exceeding
$150,000 be paid in periodic ~yments, with future damages lower than $150,000 awarded using
periodic payments at the discretion of the court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § .60-3408 (1994) (providing
that in medical malpractice liability actions where there are damages for future economic losses,
the verdict must specify a period of time over which payment for such losses will be made).
355. Symposium, Reforming Punitive Damages.· The Punitive Damage Debate, 38 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 469, 469 (2001) (discussing a public symposium held by the Harvard Journal on
Legislation in March 2001 titled "Refonning Punitive Damages"). The issues at the core of the
punitive damages debate include (a) the theoretical purpose of such damages, (b) disagreements
over the empirical evidence, and (c) policy disagreements over whether there should be refonns
of punitive damage law. /d. at 470. See generally Theodore Eisenberg, Measuring the Deterrent
Effect of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 347 (1998) (responding to Viscusi's article on the social
costs of punitive damages cited below); Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive
Damages; An Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV~ 743 (2002) (comparing data on punitive
damages imposed by judges and juries); Marc Galanter, Shadow Play: The Fabled Menace of
Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. I (introducing articles that were the product of a
conference on the future of punitive damages); Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and the
Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421 (1998) (commenting on and providing an
alternative to the analysis of punitive damages by Polinsky and Shaven cited below); David
Luban, A Flawed Case Against Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 359 (1998) (criticizing Viscusi's
article on the social costs of punitive damages cited below); M. Stuart Madden, Renegade
Conduct and Punitive Damages in Tort, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1175 (2002) (reviewing the- matrix in
which punitive damages exist and the availability of punitive damage awards in several states);
Paul Magin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179
( 1998) (considering whether in federal cases judges rather than juries should detennine the level
of punitive damages); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
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relatively infrequent basis in civil litigation, substantial verdicts that
356
receive wide publicity have generated controversy.
In addition to
court decisions circumscribing the situations where punitive damages
are available, legislatures have employed statutory provisions to limit
357
their scope and use.
There are several ways statutory provisions limiting the availability
of punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases could be drafted.
The trigger for punitive damages could be raised from the standard of
willful, wanton, or gross misconduct to a standard requiring that the
358
veterinarian defendant have "actual malice."
The evidentiary burden
of proof for punitive damages could be set at a standard of "clear and
35
convincing evidence." 9
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869 (1998) (setting forth principles for detennining when punitive
damages should be awarded and at what levels); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive
Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002)

(analyzing the empirical literature on punitive damages and the impact of punitive damage
refonn); David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damage Assessment,
39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121 (2002) (discussing the assessment of punitive damages using
management theory); W. Kip Viscusi, Punitive Damages: The Social Costs of Punitive Damages
Against Corporations in Environmental .a nd Safety Torts, 87 GEO. L.J. 285 (1998) (proposing the
abolishment of punitive damages in environmental and product liability cases); W. Kip Viscusi,
Why There Is No Defense of Punitive Damages, 87 GEO. L.J. 381 ( 1998) (replying to critics of his
article on punitive damages and providing additional infonnation supporting his argument against
punitive damages).
356. George L. Priest, The Problem and Efforts To Understand It (discussing punitive
damages generally and the controversy surrounding punitive damages), in PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
How JURIES DECIDE 1-3 (Cass R. Sunstein et al. eds., 2002); Galanter, supra note 75, at 744-48
(citing to one study that found that "virtually all" television coverage was triggered if a verdict
had an "unusually large" punitive damage awards). Note that the media has reported several
cases that have discussed significant monetary awards for injury or death to animals. Julie
Scelfo, Good Dogs~ Bad Medicine? More Pet Owners Sue for Malpractice and Win, NEWSWEEK,
May 21, 2001, at 52 (stating that a 1997 Kentucky jury awarded $15,000 to the owner of a
German shepherd that bled to death from a botched surgery, and that a California judge in 2000
awarded $27,699 to a woman for the suffering of her dog resulting from bungled dental repairs).
357. Cf COLO. REv. STAT.§ 13-64-302.5 (2003) (limiting availability of exemplary damages
in medical malpractice cases); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115 (2002) (stating that punitive,
exemplary, vindictive, or aggravated damages are not allowed in healing-art and legal malpractice
cases); Peck et al., supra note 113, at 411-13 (discussing statutory restrictions on punitive
damages under Florida law); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Reining in Punitive Damages "Run WildH:
Proposals for Reform by Courts and Legislatures, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 1003, 1012-34 (1999)
(proposing refonns for punitive damages).
358. Schwartz et al., supra note 357, at 1009, 1013 (discussing the use of different standards
for the imposition of punitive damages and proposing the use of an "actual malice" trigger,
stating that although such a trigger is more conservative than what is currently the law in most
states, it would "help separate conduct that is particularly reprehensible and worthy of
punishment from that which is not").
359. /d. at 1013-14 (stating that this standard is now law in twenty-nine states and the District
of Columbia and is the recommendation of principal academic groups that have analyzed the
issue over the last ten years).
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Providing for caps or proportionality on punitive damages is also an
360
option for legislatures.
States could implement special pleading rules
361
for claims that include punitive damages.
Although it appears that
punitive damages in veterinary malpractice cases will likely be imposed
infrequently, providing certainty in the form of a cap may assuage the
362
fears of those concerned about runaway verdicts.
3. Safeguards for Veterinarians
It is possible to include safeguards in any veterinary malpractice act
to reduce the likelihood that spurious claims will be brought against
veterinarians. These types of safeguards are commonly found in
medical liability acts, but unless there is specific statutory language,
363
courts have found that they do not apply to veterinarians.
In creating
these types of safeguards, legislatures have balanced the needs of
physicians and patients. If non-economic damages become available
for the loss of animals, veterinarians should receive similar
consideration.

360. /d. at 1014-19 (discussing proportionality and state statutes that limit punitive damage
awards). Setting the cap of punitive damages as a multiple of the economic or non-economic
damages is one option. /d. at 1015-16. Bifurcating a trial involving punitive damages and
excluding evidence of a defendant's net worth are also possible refonns proposed to bring more
"equity" in punitive damage awards. /d. at 1018-19.
361. Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading Laws, 78
NEB. L. REv. 412, 42a-21, 433-35 (1999) (discussing special pleadings for punitive damages
requests in Aorida and other states).
362. See supra notes 267-72 and accompanying text (discussing the limited number of
veterinary malpractice cases involving punitive damages); cf Michael L. Rustad, Unraveling
Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 15, 50 (discussing a
study of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases that found that these types of damages
were "generally awarded appropriately to punish the most egregious medical malpractice
abuses ... [involving] ... extreme deviation from professional standards of care"). Rustad also
found that there were "hot spots" in medical malpractice litigation that formed the bulk of
punitive damages awarded in medical malpractice cases. /d. at 34. Rustad cites a 1995 study by
the Justice Department that found that the "rate and size of punitive damage awards varies by
substantive field of law,'' with the rate of punitive damages of three percent in medical
malpractice cases. /d. at 27. Note that courts generally refuse to enforce contracts to provide
insurance coverage for punitive damages. Tom Baker, Reconsidering Insurance for Punitive
Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 101, 101. Although punitive damages then would not impact
malpractice insurance rates, individual veterinarians would bear the economic impact of punitive
damages. This supports the objective of providing deterrence for egregious behavior but also
illustrates the need for caution in allowing punitive damages.
363. E.g., Neasbitt v. Warren, 22 S.W.3d 107, 108 (2000) (finding that the Texas Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act does not apply to veterinarians).
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a. Standard of Care
A statutory provision could set forth the requisite standards of
practice for veterinarians in those states where case law has not
established an applicable standard of care, and where the standard of
364
care needs clarification.
Obviously, a state providing that the locality
rule applies would set a lower standard of care than a state that provides
for the application of a universal rule for all veterinarians. As discussed
above, the trend of recent cases rejects the locality rule, given the
widespread accessibility of infortrtation on new and improved
365
As with physicians who are specialists,
treatments for animals.
veterinarians who hold themselves out as specialists for a species or a
66
type of treatment should be held to the standard of such specialists.3
Setting a standard of care of gross negligence or reckless or intentional
misconduct prior to civil liability in emergency situations exists by
statute in some states and should be adopted if not already
367
established.

364. Cf.

ALA .. CODE§ 6-5-548 (1993

& Supp. 2003); id. § 6-5-549 (stating that the minimum

standard of proof in medical malpractice cases shall be proof by substantial evidence); id. § 6-5572 (1993) (setting out the standard of care in legal service liability actions); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 766.102 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (setting the standard of care as that of similar health care
providers); MICH. COMP~ LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (West 2000) (setting the standard of practice
for physicians in medical malpractice cases); NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2810 (1998) (providing that
the standard of care in medical malpractice cases be that of health care providers in the same or
similar communities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.12 (2003) (providing a standard of care for
medical malpractice actions as that of professionals situated in the same or similar communities);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-115 (2000 & Supp. 2003) (setting the standard of practice for medical
malpractice cases and assigning of the burdens of proof); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1908 (2002)
(providing that health care professionals must meet the standard of care exercised by prudent
health care professionals engaged in similar practices under the same or similar circumstances).
365. See supra notes 135-69 and accompanying text (discussing the standard of care in
veterinary malpractice cases). Note that another option is to provide that the standard of care be
set by veterinarians in the community or in similar communities. This standard may still result in
a lower standard of care, but plaintiffs have access to a greater pool of possible experts.
366. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a (setting the standard of practice for
physicians in medical malpractice cases and providing that specialists will be held to the standard
of care of other specialists in the community or similar communities); see also supra note 18 and
accompanying text (discussing the growing number of veterinarians specializing in areas of
treatment).
367. ALASKA STAT. § 09.65.097 (2002) (stating that a veterinarian providing emergency care
to an injured or sick animal will not be liable for civil damages as a result of the care, but not
precluding liability for civil damages as a result of gross negligence or reckless or intentional
misconduct); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 333.18826 (2000) (providing protection from liability
for civil damages in situations where animals have been brought to a veterinarian by someone
other than their owners, but stating that the section would not apply if acts amount to gross
negligence or willful and wanton misconduct); OR. REV. STAT. § 686.440 (200 1) (providing
immunity from civil liability for emergency treatment of animals under certain circumstances and
stating that the section does not apply to acts that constitute gross negligence).

.
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Similar to setting the standard of care, a statutory provision could
provide for a special burden of proof prior to recovery. In any
malpractice case, the plaintiff will have the burden of showing that the
injury claimed was proximately caused by the act or omission of the
368
professional.
An example of a special burden of proof could consist
of a requirement that the plaintiff would not recover unless the plaintiff
shows that but for the defendant's negligence, there was a greater than
369
50% chance of survival or a better result.
Another option is to statutorily circumscribe causes of action to
specific situations. An example of this would be limiting actions based
on lack of infortned consent to non-emergency treatments and
articulating defenses that can be used for claims based on a lack of
370
informed consent.
b. Screening Panel
A measure that can be required before or after the filing of a
371
malpractice action is the convening of a screening or review panei.
The membership of the panel would be designated by statute and would
generally consist of attorneys and, in the case of veterinary malpractice,
372
licensed veterinarians.
The screening panel's purpose is to provide
recommendations on the issue of whether the professional has met the

368. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a cause of action
for a veterinary malpractice action).
369. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912a(2) (setting forth the burden for plaintiffs in
medical malpractice cases). The specific language in the Michigan statute is: "In an action
alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff cannot recover for loss of an opportunity to survive or
an opportunity to achieve a better result unless the opportunity was greater than 50%." /d.
370. Cf. IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.137 (West 1997) (providing a presumption that informed
consent was given in medial or surgical procedures if statutory requirements are met); NEB. REv.
STAT.§ 44-2820 (1998) (setting forth the burden of proof in actions based on the failure to obtain
informed consent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 (2003) (setting forth specific standards for the
recovery of damages for claims based on the lack of informed consent of a patient or the patient's
representatives); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2002) (limiting medical, dental,
and podiatric malpractice actions based on lack of infonned consent and providing defenses to
such actions); see also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4401-a (McKinney 1992) (providing for a motion for
judgment during a trial for medical malpractice based solely on lack of informed consent if there
has not been expert medical testimony supponing the insufficiency of the consent); OR. REV.
STAT. § 677.097 (2001) (setting forth the procedure to obtain patients' informed consent); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1909 (2002) (limiting medical malpractice actions based on lack of
inforrned consent to specified circumstances).
371. Cf KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3502 (1994 & Supp. 2003) (discussing a screening panel for
professional liability actions); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840 (1998) (setting forth rules relating to
medical review panels for medical malpractice claims).
372. Cf. KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3502 (discussing membership selection of screening panels for
professional liability actions).
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373
care.

applicable standard of
Unlike the activities of a mediator or
mediation panel, the written report of a screening panel would be
admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and the panel members
374
could be called as witnesses at such a proceeding.
c. Special Pleading Rules
Another safeguard for veterinarians is to implement special pleading
rules for malpractice claims. Generally, these standards require the
pleading of additional facts or set notice or certificate of merit
375
requirements.
One option is to require special notice before the filing of a veterinary
376
m'l.lpractice claim.
An analogous example in medical malpractice
claims is found in Michigan law, which requires that a plaintiff file a
notice setting forth a factual statement of the claim up to 182 days prior
377
The statute then provides
to the filing of a suit based on such facts.
for access to records and a time for the defendants to respond to the
378
These types of notice provisions encourage the
allegations.
379
settlement of malpractice claims prior to formallitigation.
Another example of a special pleading rule is the requirement that a
"certificate of review" be filed with any claim for negligence against a
380
The purposes of such certificates include the reduction
veterinarian.
373. Cf. id.
374. Cf id.
375. Parness et al., supra note 361, at 413.
376. Cf. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§ 364 (1982) (providing that at least ninety days' notice must
be given to a health care provider prior to the commencement of litigation based on such
provider's professional negligence); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.106 (1997 & West Supp. 2003)
(requiring at least ninety days notice prior to filing suit for medical malpractice claims); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2912b (West 2000) (setting forth a notice requirement for plaintiffs in
medical malpractice cases).
377. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 600.2912b.
378. /d.
379~ Roberts v. Mecosta County Gen. Hosp. 610 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000),
rev'd, 642 N.W.2d 663 (Mich. 2002).
380. Colorado law requires that such a certificate be filed for claims against any licensed
professional based on negligence. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-20-602 (2003). New Jersey also
requires that an affidavit be filed in actions based on malpractice by licensed persons, including
veterinarians. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West 2000) (referring to licensed persons in
section 2A:53A-26, which includes accountants, architects, attorneys, engineers, physicians, and
veterinarians). Other states require certificates of review in professional negligence actions, but
the laws do not encompass claims against veterinarians. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.104 (West
1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring attorneys filing medical negligence actions to-certify that there
has been a reasonable investigation into the grounds for the complaint); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 544.42 (West 2000 & Supp. 2003) (re,q uiring certification of expert review in malpractice
actions against professionals, defined as, attorney, architects, certified public accountants,
engineers, land surveyors, and landscape architects); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 538.225 (West 2000)
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of frivolous claims and the protection of the defendant from reputational
381
harm.
These certificates typically require plaintiffs to show that they
have "consulted a person who has expertise in the area of the alleged
negligent conduct, and the expert has concluded that the claim is
382
meritorious."
Any certificate or "affidavit of merit" could require the
professional serving as the plaintiff's expert to state that the applicable
standard of care was breached, set forth the specific actions that should
have been taken or omitted, and provide information on how the actions
383
or inactions caused the injury.
A parallel requirement could be
established for the defendants of veterinary malpractice actions in which
the defendant must provide an affidavit of meritorious defense. 384 In
the alternative, a state could require that a bond be filed or cash be
placed in an escrow account for each professional named in the
385
action.

(providing that an affidavit must be filed no later than 90 days after the filing of the ·petition and
that the plaintiff shall obtain the written opinion of a legally qualified health care provider); NEV.
REv. STAT. ANN. 4lA.071 (Michie Supp. 2003) (requiring that an affidavit by a medical expert
be included with any filing in any actions for medical malpractice filed in the district court); N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3012-a (McKinney 1991) (providing that a complaint in a medical, dental, or podiatric
malpractice actions must be accompanied by a certificate, executed by the attorney, that includes,
among other things, certification that the attorney has consulted with one professional in the area
where the alleged malpractice has occurred and that there is a reasonable basis for the
commencement of such an action, or that such consultation should be excused). See generally
Jeffrey A. Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special Certificates
of Merit?, BYU L. REv. 537 (.1997) (discussing the effectiveness of special certificates of merit).
Certificates of merit have also been required in other professional malpractice claims, and in
product liability claims and certain sexual abuse claims. ld. at 539; see also Parness et al., supra
note 361, at 416-20 (discussing special pleading rules in professional malpractice cases).
381. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 380, at 541 _,52 (discussing rationales for special
certificates of merit and proposing changes to statutes); see also Leo, supra note 104, at 1404-05
(stating that a purpose of the Minnesota statutory provision requiring an affidavit of expert review
is "to reduce the cost of medical insurance by preventing frivolous medical malpractice claims'').
382. Hamilton v. Thompson, 23 P.3d 114, 115 n.2 (Colo. 2001) (citing to the failure of a
client to file a certificate of review in connection with a counterclaim based on a veterinarian's
professional negligence as support for the dismissal of such counterclaim).
383. Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.29l2d (West 2000) (setting forth an affidavit of
merit requirement for plaintiffs in medical malpractice cases).
384. Cf. id. § 600.2912e (setting forth an obligation of defendants in medical malpractice
actions to provide an affidavit of meritorious defense).
385. Cf TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 13.01 (repealed 2003) (providing for bond
or escrow in lieu of filing an expert report pursuant to the Texas Medical Liability and Insurance
Improvement Act). This act has been found not to apply to veterinarians. Neasbitt v. Warren, 22
S.W.3d 107, 112 (Tex. 2000).
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To ensure prompt action by clients in filing their claims, states could
pass a special statute of limitations for veterinary malpractice claims,
386
requiring them to be brought earlier than other negligence claims.
d. Other Safeguards
It is not always clear whether expressions of sympathy or gestures in
387
Because of this
the form of apologies are admissible in court.
uncertainty, veterinarians and their staffs may be cautious about
expressing their sorrow after the death of an animal under their care.
There is evidence that many lawsuits arise out of anger resulting from
88
the "failure of another party to express regret or sympathy."3
Clarifying veterinarians' or their staff members' ability to express
sympathy may reduce the likelihood that a malpractice suit will be
389
filed.
In order to ensure that expert witnesses in veterinary malpractice
actions have a realistic view of the practice, a provision could include a
requirement that any such expert witness must have devoted a
percentage of his or her professional time, within a period preceding the
390
incident, to clinical practice.
Although the percentage of animals covered by health insurance in
the United States is still quite low, just as in other types of litigation, a
veterinarian who is held liable for malpractice should be allowed to
introduce evidence of insurance coverage in order to reduce the amount
391
of veterinary fees the veterinarian may have to reimburse.
386. Cf Leo, supra note 104, at 1404 (stating that "[n]early every state has a special statute of
limitations for medical negligence claims").
387. CAL. EVID. CODE§ 1160 cmt. (West Supp. 2004).
388. /d.
389. /d.; see also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 233, § 230 (Law. Co-op 2000) (providing that under
certain circumstances, statements expressing sympathy will be inadmissible as evidence of an
admission of liability in civil actions); TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 18.061 (Vernon
Supp. 2004) (setting forth restrictions on the admission of communications of sympathy in civil
actions).
390. Cf COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-401 (2003) (setting forth the qualifications required of
expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions); IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.139 (West 1997)
(setting forth expert witness standards in medical malpractice cases); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 603412 ( 1994) (providing that expert witnesses in medical malpractice actions to have spent at least
fifty percent of their professional time in clinic practice within the two years preceding the
incident at issue); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-l, R. 702 (2003) (setting forth the criteria for expert
witnesses in medical malpractice actions and requiring that such experts have spent a majority of
their time teaching or in active practice during the year immediately preceding the action alleged).
391. Cf CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1 (1997 & West Supp. 2004) (setting forth the right of a
defendant in a medical malpractice action to bring evidence of benefits paid and the right of a
plaintiff in such an action to introduce evidence of the costs incurred to secure his or her rights to
such benefits).
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Finally, it is also possible to require the trier of fact to articulate how
the damages were calculated, distinguishing between economic and
non-economic damages, which would force judges or juries to justify
392
Presumably, given the low economic value of
their damage awards.
most animals, the bulk of any damage award for veterinary malpractice
in a jurisdiction that allowed for non-economic damages would be for
these damages.
4. Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution
It may also be appropriate to encourage the greater use of alternative
393
forms of dispute resolution in these cases.
There is concern that
alternative methods of dispute resolution may be abused when applied
394
to disputes between consumers and providers of goods and services.
Notwithstanding this concern, in situations where alternatives such as
binding arbitration have been agreed upon by the parties, such
395
procedures should be supported.
392. Cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-64-204 (2003) (providing that special damages findings are
required for certain tort claims); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1706 (2002) (requiring special
findings in medical malpractice case damages); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 893.55 (West 1997)
(providing for the articulation of various damages recovered for medical malpractice cases).
393. Scoggins, supra note 95, at 986; see also Harold W. Hannah, Reducing Your Malpractice
Vulnerability, 209 J. AM. VETERINARY MED. ASS'N 1859, 1859 (1996) (discussing the use of
alternative forms of dispute resolution and other ways veterinarians can reduce their vulnerability
to malpractice claims). The largest insurer of veterinarians, the AVMA's PLIT, has not been
involved in any fonnalized ADR program. Shirbroun Interview, supra note 93.
394. See Jean R. Stemlight, Gateway Widens Doorway to Imposing Unfair Binding
Arbitration on Consumers, 71 FLA. B.J. 8, (1997) (discussing impact of court decisions that allow
companies to impose binding arbitration agreements on consumers); Jean R. Stemlight,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration: A
Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L.
REv. 1 ( 1997) (challenging the assumption that binding arbitration raises no constitutional
concerns). Other issues raised by the decreasing percentage of cases that go to trial is the lack of
decisions that can be used as precedent, the impact on the right to trial by jury, and isolation of
the justice system from the public. Hope Viner Samborn, The Vanishing Trial, A.B.A. J., Oct.
2002, at 24, 26 (2002).
395. All types of alternative dispute resolution can produce binding results, however, only
agreements to arbitrate can bind parties entering into them before disputes arise. STEPHEN J.
WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7-8 (2001). But see KIMBERLEE K. KOVACH,
MEDIATION PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 57 (2d ed. 2000) (stating that "it currently appears that
most courts will enforce voluntary mediation clauses"). There is also specific statutory support
for binding arbitration in the context of medical malpractice actions. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1295 (West 1982) (providing for specific language on any contract for medical services
containing a binding arbitration clause); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-403 (2003) (setting forth
circumstances under which binding arbitration procedures for medical malpractice claims will not
be deemed contrary to the public policy of the state); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.207 (West 1997 &
Supp. 2004) (setting forth rules relating to voluntary binding arbitration of medical negligence
claims); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/155.20 (2002) (providing that medical malpractice disputes
subject to arbitration will be binding on insurance companies); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
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Given the emotional nature of a claim, often arising out of the death
of an animal, mediation could play an essential role in reducing the
number of claims that are litigated. 396
Mediation in medical
malpractice actions often utilizes specific statutory provisions reflecting
the interests of all parties. 397 For example, in Michigan, rather than
having one or two mediators conduct a mediation, a five-member panel
consisting of three attorneys and two medical professionals controls
mediation. 398 Given the considerably lower dollar value of veterinary
malpractice cases, a single mediator or three-member panels may be
more appropriate. Given the expertise of current members of boards of
veterinary practice, such board members could be called upon to act on
such panels.
Although mediation is non-binding by its very nature, it is possible to
establish consequences for any future litigation arising out of the
mediation. 399 As an example, a unanimous panel could determine that
an action or defense is frivolous and without merit, and any party
raising such an action or defense at trial could be required to post a
bond; if judgment is entered against the party posting the bond, the bond
could be used for payment of costs incurred by the other parties
responding to the action or defense deemed frivolous. 400
Another consequence of a party rejecting a unanimous mediation
panel could be the requirement that the "losing" party, which rejected

§ 600.2912g (West 2000) (providing for binding arbitration in claims of medical malpractice
when the alleged damages are less than $75,000 and setting forth specific rules relating to such
arbitration proceeding); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 21-258-3 (Michie 1987) (providing for a warning
clause in agreements to arbitrate for medical malpractice cases); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 7002
(2002) (validating voluntary arbitration in medical malpractice actions).
396. KOVACH, supra note 395, at 48-49 (discussing the role of emotions in the mediation
process); WILSON, supra note 14, at 119 (reporting that according to sources at the California
State Board, 50 to 70% of grievances relate to the death of an animal).
397. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§§ 600.4903-.4923 (West 2000) (setting forth the procedures
for a medical malpractice mediation); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.11 (West 2000) (requiring parties
to discuss and determine whether a form of ADR is appropriate in each medical malpractice
case); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.42-.61 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003) (setting forth a mediation
system in medical malpractice cases and providing for a three-member panel consisting of a
public member, an attorney, and a health care provider).
398. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4905.
399. The consequences can be informal, such as the psychological benefits of having your
case reviewed by an outsider prior to litigation, or formal, as described below. Court ordered
non-binding arbitration is also possible. Cf FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766. 107 (1997 & West Supp.
2004) (providing for non-binding arbitration for medical negligence cases at the motion of either
party).
400. Cf MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.4915 (providing for evaluation and awards by a
panel in medical malpractice mediation).
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an evaluation, be required to pay the costs of the other party~
Even if
"mandatory mediation" is not included in a statutory provision, there
could be a requirement that a settlement conference be held before the
402
matter goes to trial.
The use of alternative fom1s of dispute resolution would require the
support of the veterinary community at large, but the adoption of such
dispute resolution systems has occurred in other professions, with some
403
degree of success.

VI. CONCLUSION
The current system is not ideal, either for veterinarians or their
clients. Veterinarians are now feeling the pressure of an increasing
number of claims with the po-s sibility of significant damage awards.
Not knowing the outer limit of the damages that could occur if a suit is
successful makes it difficult to detennine the appropriate pricing and
coverage of malpractice insurance. Malpractice insurance costs will
increase as companies try to stay ahead of potential claims.. Increased
insurance costs will then likely cause increased prices for the services
that veterinarians provide possibly pricing some clients out of the
market and limiting access to necessary medical services for their
animals. From a client's perspective, the damages currently available in
many jurisdictions do not reflect the value of these animalseconomically or otherwise. Limiting damages to economic value also
fails to support the general tort goals of deterrence of wrongful acts,
appropriate compensation of victims, and affirmation of societal values.
Given the current legal status -o f animals as personal property,
without considerable judicial activism or the adoption of legislation, it is
.

.

.

401. Cf id. § 600.4921 (adjusting costs ifthere has been a rejection of a unanimous panel
evaluation in medical malpractice mediation).
402. Cf ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 16(c) (providing for comprehensive pretrial conferences in medical
malpractice cases and requiring that a date be set for a mandatory settlement conference); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 766.108 (West 1997 & Supp. 2004) (requiring mandatory settlement conferences
in medical malpractice actions); KAN. STAT. ANN. 60-3413 (1994) (requiring settlement
conferences in medical malpractice actions); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41A.081 (Michie Supp.
2003) (requiring settlement conferences in actions for medical malpractice).
403. See KOVACH, supra note 395, at 352 (discussing the use of mediation in the resolution of
attorney-client disputes). See generally id. at 339-57 (discussing specialized applications of
mediation). Mediation has been proposed as an alternative to veterinary disputes in Canada.
Elizabeth Saul, To Litigate or Mediate, That Is the Question!, 40 CAN. VET. J. 243, 243 (1999)
(discussing mediation as an alternative to litigation in veterinary disputes). Mediation is already
used in other disputes relating to animals. Quentin Hardy, If Things Get Catty in Marin County,
Police Call Ms. Greer: A Pet Mediator, She Referees Dogged Animal Disputes; Ruff Justice for
Rocky, WALL ST. J., June 6, 1997, at AI (discussing the use of a pet mediator to deal both with
disputes between neighbors and custody disputes), available at 1997 WL-WSJ 2423244.
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unlikely that there will be widespread establishment of standards that
allow clients to be compensated at something other than a fair market
value of their companion animals in the near future. Every legislative
session provides an opportunity for organizations concerned about
animal welfare and the relationship between humans and their animals
to propose new statutory language. Adoption of such legislation is
controversial. It is good public policy to have laws that reflect the
changing nature of the relationship between people and their animals,
but such laws must consider the impact on the health of animals overall.
A balanced approach that provides for capped non-economic damages is
an important starting point in recognizing the changed status of these
animals in our society while also encouraging professionals to continue
providing quality veterinary care.

•
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APPENDIX
PROPOSED STATUTORY

Definitions As used in this Section

404
LANGUAGE

, unless the context otherwise

•

requtres:
(1) "Animal-companion" means a dog, cat, or any warm-blooded
domesticated nonhuman animal that is owned or kept by a person
primarily for purposes of companionship.
(2) "Owner" means the legal owner of an animal-companion and the
people residing in the Owner's household who have a demonstrable
bond with the animal-companion.
(3) "Veterinarian" means a person who has received a doctoral
degree in veterinary medicine or its equivalent from a school of
veterinary medicine and is licensed to practice pursuant to [cross
citation to veterinary licensing section].
(4) "Veterinary service" means a service or procedure included
within the practice of veterinary medicine, as defined in [cross citation
to veterinary practice act].

Damages for Harm Resulting from Veterinary Malpractice
(1) If it is proven, in a civil action, that a veterinarian has through
negligent veterinary practice, performance, or prescription of veterinary
services, caused the injury or death of an animal-companion, the
animal-companion's Owner may recover the damages described in this
subsection
.
(2) Economic damages may be recovered for the fair monetary value
of the animal-companion, veterinary costs and fees, and reasonable
burial expenses of the deceased animal-companion.
(3) Non-economic damages may be recovered for the loss of the
reasonably expected society, companionship, comfort, protection, and
services of the animal-companion as well as the pain, suffering, and
emotional distress sustained by the Owner.

404. This statutory language is derived in part from a variety of sources. See TENN. CODE
ANN. § 44-17-403 (2000) (providing for damages of up to $4000 for the emotional distress
caused by the loss of a pet because of the negligent act of another); H.R. 03-1260, 64th Gen.
Assem. (Colo. 2003) (proposing damages for harm from negligent veterinary practices as well as
cruelty to animals); H.R. 932, 183rd Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2003) (providing for noneconomic and capped punitive damages for the tortious injury or killing of a companion animal);
H.R. 7610, 224th Leg., Ann. Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (allowing for damages of up to $5000 in a
proposed bill); W aisman & Newell, supra note 83, at 71-73 (proposing legislation providing a
general remedy for people whose companion animals have been wrongfully injured).
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(4) Any award of non-economic damages under this section may not
exceed twenty-five thousands dollars ($25,000).

